Notes de la FRS

Decoupling or de-risking North Korea’s resilient isolation

Publication générique pour un programme/observatoire n°00/2023
Antoine Bondaz
December 20, 2023 Download (PDF)

Last October, the author of this note mentioned the likely scenario that North Korea would undertake “a form of partial and selective diplomatic decoupling from other countries that are not prepared to make the slightest concession to North KoreaBondaz Antoine, “Isolement ou intégration ? Le réseau diplomatique nord-coréen”, Korea Program on Security and Diplomacy, FRS, octobre 2023. . Since then, embassies and diplomatic posts in Angola, Bangladesh, Congo, Guinea, Hong Kong, Nepal, Senegal, Spain and Uganda have been closed. Noting the continuing deterioration in relations between North Korea and a large number of countries, not just in the West, we added that this would lead “the regime to prioritise its relations with other states”, particularly those also subject to sanctions or at least international pressure.

An article published by Ruediger Frank a few days ago refers to a new strategy of “de-risking” on the part of Pyongyang, using a term that has become central to the need to reduce the dependence of many Western countries on ChinaFrank Ruediger, “North Korea’s De-risking Strategy and Its Implications”, 38 North, December 13, 2023.. According to this Austrian academic specialising in the country, North Korea is now seeking to “avoid risks rather than manage them” in the context of a “geopolitical return to a new Cold War”. He points out that “membership of a new, solid alliance with Moscow and Beijing is helping to offset the economic and political costs of a return to a conservative, state-centred economic policy and international isolationism”. His analysis takes a long-term view and aims to demonstrate a fundamental change in Pyongyang’s posture. It is clear that its strategy is changing, but is the Russian invasion of Ukraine or a “new Cold War” the main reason?

The information reaching us from the country is patchy, even more so since its closure of 2020 due to the pandemic, which led the Western embassies, the four resident foreign NGOs – all of them European – and the UN and non-UN international organisations (such as the Red Cross) to withdraw their staff. It is therefore difficult to analyse the reasons for North Korea’s choices, especially as the regime has not tried to justify the recent closing of some of its diplomatic posts abroad. However, there are two major underlying trends which might provide a better understanding of North Korea’s strategy: its isolation and its resilience.