French deterrence in the third nuclear age

Introduction

The existence of different “nuclear ages” is above all a theoretical construct, a concept designed to facilitate a certain reading of strategic history since the invention of nuclear wea-pons. Nevertheless, the notion is useful for highlighting certain trends. Beyond the academic sphere, it has gradually found its way into the political and strategic discourse, particularly in the United States. The notion does not define boundaries between hermetic temporal eras in a precise or indisputable manner and is relatively Western-centric. However, it is relevant to the analysis because of its influence on the nuclear policy actually pursued by states. For example, American missile defense policy over the past twenty years has been largely shaped by a desire to address the threat posed by the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles by proliferating states, and not just with the aim of maintaining a form of strategic stability based on mutual vulnerability with Russia. The development of certain non-nuclear capabilities also follows this logic. Some of these political decisions are today at the root of the challenges of the third nuclear ageAndrew Futter, Benjamin Zala, “Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age”, European Journal of International Security, 2021..

It is generally accepted that the first nuclear age was characterized by confrontation between two superpowers (the United States and the USSR), fear of a major East-West confrontation and a bilateral arms race. A form of equilibrium and stability was based on the concept of mutually assured destruction, the ability to retaliate and the progressive adoption of arms control mechanismsSee in particular Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989 and John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.. Extended deterrence was also developed to contribute to strategic stabilityJenny Naylor, “The Third Nuclear Age”, Comparative Strategy, vol. 38, n° 4, 2019..

The second nuclear age is said to have begun at the end of the Cold War, following the demise of the Soviet Union and the logic of blocsGregory D. Koblentz, “Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age”, Council Special Report, n° 71,Council on Foreign Relations, November 2014; Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler, Shane Mason (eds.), The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age, Stimson Center, May 2016; Zenel Garcia, “Strategic stability in the twenty-first century: The challenge of the Second Nuclear Age and the logic of stability interdependence”, Comparative Strategy, vol. 36, n° 4, 2017.. Fred Iklé first described it in 1996, noting the changes underway and the emerging challengesFred Charles Iklé, “The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, n° 1, 1996.. It was marked by the emergence of new threats linked to the risks of proliferation, nuclear multipolarity, the connection between the acquisition of nuclear weapons and other WMD, and regional crises. Against a backdrop of reduced tensions between the two major nuclear powers, it was accompanied by a reflection on the emergence of new players in the nuclear game and featured a desire to bring multila-teral institutions into play to reduce the instability caused by nuclear proliferation in several regions of the globeSee in particular Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1999; Paul Bracken, “The structure of the Second Nuclear Age”, Orbis, vol. 47, n° 3, 2003; Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014..

Interestingly, theorist Colin Gray foresaw in 1999 that “the second nuclear age can be seen as a period of interregnum between irregular cycles of peaks in the kind of great power rivalry that organizes many dimensions of strategic history”Colin S. Gray, Ibid.. Indeed, for several years now, theorists and observers of the international landscape have been heralding the emergence of a third nuclear age. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing indirect confrontation with NATO seem to symbolize this change. This era is marked by a return to deterrence between great powers, in a multipolar world in which domains of confrontation overlapRebecca Hersman, “Wormhole escalation in the new nuclear age”, Texas National Security Review, Summer 2020; Nicholas L. Miller, Vipin Narang, “Is a new nuclear age upon us? Why we may look back on 2019 as the point of no return”, Foreign Affairs, December 2019; Jenny L. Naylor, op. cit.. Three trends have been identified as characteristic of this new age: a new emphasis on the concept of deterrence, the confrontation of great powers in proxy wars and asymmetrical wars “under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence”, and “links between regional conflict dynamics and the strategic game of the big players”Pierre Vandier, La dissuasion au troisième âge nucléaire, Editions du Rocher, 2018..

Some believe that the third nuclear age is characterized above all by the deployment of certain non-nuclear weapons of a strategic nature, which are impacting global stability. These technological developments, most of which stem from the second nuclear age, are occurring alongside the revival of a marked hostility between great powers, reminiscent of the circumstances of the first nuclear age. The interweaving of conventional and nuclear forces, characterized by the development of dual-use weapons or ambiguity about the nature of the wea-pons, is also seen as a feature of the third nuclear age.

France’s deterrence posture has not been profoundly altered by these paradigm shifts. France has chosen to continue relying on a robust nuclear deterrent since the end of the Cold War and has to some extent anticipated the renewed strategic competition between nuclear-armed states. However, these changes require us to rethink certain policies, especially as these may be linked to new technological developments. In this context, it is interesting to observe how France sees its place in the third nuclear age. This reflection comes at a time when political and capability choices are being made, and when technological turning points are being addressed. It also aims to analyze how France’s strategy integrates with the analyses of its allies and partners, and in particular how it takes account of European defense issues.

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