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# **Disarmament diplomacy Motivations and objectives of the main actors in nuclear disarmament**

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## INTRODUCTION

The rejection of nuclear weapons and the disarmament movement gained momentum shortly after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, culminating in major civic protests in the 1970s. These campaigns primarily involved the citizens of nuclear-weapon states and their allies, but also developing countries. With a few exceptions, these movements were received with little enthusiasm and sometimes even with hostility by their respective governments during the early years of the Cold War, when they were not directly persecuted (particularly in the Soviet era).<sup>1</sup>

It was not until the 1970s that states could be considered as true "promoters" or "militants" of disarmament. More and more leaders chose to embody anti-nuclear popular demands and followed the model of leaders such as Nehru. Gradually, some of these states, such as Ireland, Sweden and New Zealand, developed genuine diplomatic strategies to make disarmament norms and practices more reflective of their preferences.

Civil society's involvement in the fight against nuclear weapons is generally well understood, particularly in the midst of the Cold War, when the perceived risk of East-West nuclear conflict was high and when some issues provoked spontaneous mass mobilization, such as nuclear testing. The "activism" of states is probably less easy to explain. For some, this positioning may indeed at first sight, run counter to obvious strategic interests. For example, New Zealand's ban on potentially nuclear Allied ship visits in its ports led to its exclusion from ANZUS (Australia-US-New Zealand alliance) in the 1980s, a potentially risky choice at a time of confrontation between the two blocs. For others, it may seem insincere. For instance, India, one of the countries that has been most consistent in challenging nuclear weapons, has finally made the choice to acquire them while preserving a very pro-disarmament discourse.

Different types of arguments and motivations have intersected to support several generations of governmental and non-governmental activists and to call for the reduction or even total elimination of nuclear weapons. Arms control measures have been considered essential to limit the risk of conflict, human, and material damage in the event of war. But moral arguments were quickly mobilized to call for the preservation of human lives while avoiding colossal expenditures that could be used for more laudable purposes. From the outset, therefore, a combination of "realistic" security interests and "idealistic" ethical and moral considerations has been the basis for the engagement of a number of actors. For others, it is rather a policy of opportunity that has justified positioning itself for disarmament, to challenge the international order inherited from the Cold War or to integrate international anti-nuclear networks.

Although it provides some explanation for some cases, the realistic school of thought has difficulty explaining many forms of disarmament diplomacy that may

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<sup>1</sup> Lawrence Wittner, *Confronting the Bomb, A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2009.

seem futile, irrational (they can be costly for few tangible benefits), and even dangerous if deterrence is considered to be a security factor. The liberal school can solve some paradoxes by emphasizing the importance for middle powers in particular of strengthening a world order based on law and in which power relations, such as deterrence, are more limited. The assumptions of the constructivist school are particularly useful in understanding the lasting commitment of some actors in this struggle. Indeed, it emphasizes the role of norms and the interest of states in promoting those that are consistent with their identities and values. Whatever the initial motivations of some states, opposition to nuclear weapons has in some cases become an inseparable part of their identity. For these countries, the question is no longer to what extent disarmament exclusively serves as their "objective" in national interests, since conforming to their own norms and promoting them on the international scene is a matter of interest in itself. The assumed anti-nuclear identity modifies an actor's perception of security and therefore its political and strategic calculations. Through conformity, sincere persuasion or identification with a group, the leaders of some countries therefore wish to reflect the anti-nuclear consensus that exists in their society and to establish their national preference as a collective preference. Subsequently, the principle of continuity but also the development of a rhetoric of conviction often drive actors to continue their investment in the elimination of nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup>

The analysis of the explicit or implicit motivations of disarmament actors has several interrelated interests. At the global and theoretical level, it provides an understanding of the mechanisms that lead actors in the international system to pursue policies that can be perceived as altruistic, idealistic or ideological. More concretely, it demonstrates the variety of arguments that push these stakeholders to take this stand, their entanglement and their mutual reinforcement. Finally, at a more tactical level, it shows how this mobilization can be pursued for sometimes indirect purposes and from an instrumental perspective.

The study of disarmament diplomacy illustrates the importance of non-security-related arguments in defining states' interests and their activism for the adoption of new norms. Concepts, sometimes called "meta-standards," such as sovereignty, justice, or positive self-image, play an essential role in the choice to pursue a particularly active policy. But this does not mean that more traditional motivations such as security, visibility, or the pursuit of domestic political benefits are not important in the implementation of these policies. Moreover, for a given national policy, motivations may change over time and be influenced by the security environment, international standards, civil society activities or a state's diplomatic relations. Different actors within the same militant group or state may also have different objectives but share the same anti-nuclear activism.

This study seeks to understand the full range of motivations behind disarmament diplomacy today. It is concerned with all states whose policies can be considered active in this regard, that is, states whose behavior and diplomatic, political or

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<sup>2</sup> Lyndon Burford, *National Identity and Nuclear Disarmament Advocacy by Canada and New Zealand*, A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Relations. The University of Auckland, New Zealand. September 2016.

financial investments seek to promote norms and practices conducive to the elimination of nuclear weapons. This definition includes all actions to advance the objective of a complete nuclear disarmament, including support for intermediate disarmament measures and challenging the merits of nuclear deterrence.<sup>3</sup> It also mentions the role of NGOs' campaigns as some are closely linked to certain national diplomatic practices.

A few disarmament typologies are developed in the existing literature. Thus, some consider that "disarmers" are motivated by six main reasons: humanitarian or ethical cause, lack of strategic utility of nuclear weapons, desire to create a more favorable climate to combat proliferation, fears of deterrence strategies considered too risky, high perception of accidental risk or a concession to obtain nuclear security commitments.<sup>4</sup> Others identify three profiles of activists: "common good" actors seeking to improve existing norms and to build bridges between positions, "stakeholders" prioritizing their national security and "radical reformers" challenging the legitimacy of the regime and unwilling to make compromises.<sup>5</sup>

Few activists, whether individuals or states, are involved in disarmament for any single reason. New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance in the late 1980s was thus justified, in order of importance, by the fear of a nuclear accident, the pride of leading the disarmament movement and a desire to act independently by resisting external pressure.<sup>6</sup> This study aims to break down the different motivations by proposing typologies of arguments and bringing together certain groups of actors whose aims have similarities. Thus, it first addresses all the humanitarian, ethical and pacifist considerations that led to the rejection of nuclear weapons. For others, the anti-nuclear fight is a niche diplomacy that allows an actor to gain preeminence and to assert its specificities. Thirdly, it shows that disarmament can be pursued to combat a world order considered unjust. Finally, for others, disarmament is approached mainly from a security perspective and with a very long-term vision.

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Marianne Hanson, "The Advocacy States", *The Non-Proliferation Review*, vol. 17, n° 1, March 2010.

<sup>5</sup> Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, "Not lost in contestation: How norm entrepreneurs frame norm development in the nuclear nonproliferation regime", *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 39, n° 3, 2018.

<sup>6</sup> Andreas Reitzig, "In defiance of nuclear deterrence: anti-nuclear New Zealand after two decades", *Medicine, Conflict and Survival*, vol. 22, n° 2, April-June 2006.

## A convergence of pacifist and humanitarian traditions

For a large number of actors, both state and non-state, nuclear disarmament is above all linked to the rejection of these weapons on ethical, moral, pacifist, humanitarian, health and even religious grounds. These beliefs can be individual or shared as part of collective identity. They may also be less deeply-rooted and be motivated chiefly by electoral objectives or to improve one's image. However, they generally underline a broader commitment to ethical issues, usually reflected in a policy that is respectful of human rights, a standard-based international order and a rejection as much as possible of the use of armed force.

### ***Neutrality, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament***

#### *Disarmament in the neutralist tradition*

##### Using a traditional role of mediator

Since the Cold War, neutral countries have been over-represented among disarmament promoters. Indeed, their strategic independence from the two superpowers allowed them to choose independently whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons. Their renunciation in this area, sometimes late, as in the case of Sweden, enabled them to engage more frankly in strategies that challenge nuclear deterrence. This opposition has naturally been more open than in states linked to nuclear powers by mutual security agreements.

Among the neutral countries best known for their role in promoting disarmament, Ireland and Sweden have distinguished themselves by their choice to use this historical neutrality to play a role of credible broker and intermediary between the two blocs during the Cold War. At the end of the World War II, the two countries confirmed their historic military neutrality, but attempted to compensate it with an active diplomacy.<sup>7</sup>

In a context where disarmament was primarily a matter of reducing the arsenals of the two superpowers, the idea of mediation between the two blocs to limit the risk of conflict and the nuclear risk was particularly relevant. As arms control remains essential today in any credible process for the elimination of nuclear weapons, this role of neutral intermediary remains relevant. In addition, the mediation tradition of neutral states has often evolved into an effort to play an in-between role in reconciling nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states in disarmament forums.<sup>8</sup> This position of honest broker is reinforced by an image of moderation

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<sup>7</sup> Richard Sinnott, "Ireland and the diplomacy of nuclear non-proliferation: the politics of incrementalism", *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. 6, 1995.

<sup>8</sup> Una Becker-Jakob, Gregor Hofmann, Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, "Good international citizens: Canada, Germany, and Sweden", in Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich (eds.), *Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control, Interests, Conflicts and Justice*, The University of Georgia Press, Athens, 2013.



and restraint, as in the case of Switzerland, where the internal political system is also built on the notion of compromise.<sup>9</sup>

### Staying away from nuclear conflicts

For Austria too, neutrality has played an important role in building an anti-nuclear identity. Beyond its immediate consequences, namely the prohibition on the Austrian government from embarking on a military program contained in the 1955 State Treaty, Austria went through the Cold War with the fear of being a passive victim of the East-West confrontation.<sup>10</sup> As it did not belong to any block, the country felt that it lacked influence and control over the decisions that could turn its territory into a field of radioactive ruins. In response to this, Vienna focused on civil defense and the promotion of multilateral disarmament.<sup>11</sup>

For the Nordic countries as well, the tradition of neutrality, an official policy for Sweden and Finland, abandoned but still influential for Norway, was seen as a safety factor. The region was aware of its crucial role in the event of a nuclear war in Europe and the specific risks faced by its population. Advocating disarmament and staying away from alliance systems appeared as a rational security choice for states like Sweden or Finland.

This perceived vulnerability of neutral states is particularly evident in the efforts made during the Cold War to provide their populations with fallout shelters, with underground constructions providing shelter for 114% of Swiss citizens, 81% of Swedes, 70% of Finns and 30% of Austrians. The Swiss slogan "neutrality is not a guarantee against radioactivity" illustrates this fear of being an indirect target and of not being able to benefit from protection against the fallout in neighboring conflicts.<sup>12</sup> These historical perceptions influenced the political choices made at the time but also had an impact to this day.

### *Nuclear disarmament in a pacifist perspective*

#### Arms control and peace

The dialectic between nuclear weapons and peace is twofold. The nuclear arms race can increase tensions between powers and lead to armed conflict: the Cuban crisis and the narrow avoidance of a third world conflict in 1962 is a case in point in this area. On the other hand, in the event of a conflict, the possession of nuclear weapons by one of the belligerents carries the seeds of a worsening confrontation and consequences.

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<sup>9</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>10</sup> State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria, Vienne, 15 May 1955. *Austria shall not possess, construct or experiment with – (a) Any atomic weapon [...]*.

<sup>11</sup> Stephan Klement, "Austria", In Harald Müller, ed., *Europe and Nuclear Disarmament: Debates and Political Attitudes in 16 European Countries*, European Interuniversity Press, Brussels, 1998.

<sup>12</sup> Daniele Mariani, "Bunkers for all", *Swiss Info*, 3 July 2009.

For these intuitive reasons, disarmament movements have often been involved in calls for peace, whether in major popular campaigns, religious mobilizations or diplomatic initiatives.<sup>13</sup>

Peace movements and anti-nuclear campaigns were intertwined in efforts to reduce tensions during the Cold War. For instance, the Canadian Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau's "Peace Initiative" was launched in 1983 at the time of the reprisal of the arms race in the early Reagan years.<sup>14</sup> More recently, the intensification of tensions between the United States and North Korea and the explicit threats of war between the two countries have been mentioned as compelling evidence of the urgency of further nuclear disarmament.<sup>15</sup> Similarly, the degradation of relations between Russia and the West with veiled nuclear threats has been the driving force behind several arms control and disarmament initiatives in the last few years.<sup>16</sup>

### Disarmament and pacifism

Beyond topical concerns linked to crises and tensions between nuclear-armed states, the commitment to disarmament of some actors stems from a structural pacifism that forges their identity. This motivation is obvious for NGOs coming from pacifist movements (Mouvement pour la Paix in France, Pax Christi in the Netherlands...) or for religious groups or states such as the Vatican and the Catholic Church.

This motivation also influences certain states where pacifism has, for various reasons, a particular weight among the population and has gradually tinged the country's identity. This is the case of Costa Rica, a country that takes pride in having abolished its army in 1948 and in having played a role as a mediator in the conflicts involving its neighbors in the 1980s and 1990s.<sup>17</sup> The linkage between pacifism and disarmament took place in particular under the presidency of Óscar Arias, with a visible commitment demonstrated from 1997 onwards for the negotiation and entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty.<sup>18</sup> The cause of nuclear disarmament was fully endorsed when Costa Rican diplomat Elayne Whyte Gómez was appointed as President of the convention and tasked to negotiate a legal instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons in 2017. While Mexico does not share such a clear-cut stance, its population remains very reluctant to support the

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<sup>13</sup> Lawrence Wittner, op. cit.

<sup>14</sup> Brett Thompson, "Pierre Elliott Trudeau's Peace Initiative: 25 Years On", *International Journal*, vol. 64, n° 4, Fall 2009.

<sup>15</sup> First Committee, General debate on all matters relating to disarmament and international security. Statement for Austria made by Robert Gerschner, Director, Department of Disarmament, Austrian Ministry of Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, New York, 3 October 2017.

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, the Japanese initiative "Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament" which was held in December 2017 and March 2018 in Hiroshima and Tokyo.

<sup>17</sup> Patrick Van Inwegen, "The Work of Costa Rica's Many Decisions for Peace", Presentation for the Western Political Science Association Conference Seattle, Washington, 17-19 April 2014.

<sup>18</sup> Luis Alberto Cordero and Kirsten A. Harmon, "Breaking the Cycle: Costa Rica, the Arms Trade Treaty and the Responsibility to Protect", *Pensamiento Propio*, n° 41, 2015.

use of force on the international scene and the themes of pacifism and disarmament have been regularly linked.<sup>19</sup>

In Japan, disarmament initiatives are also associated to the peaceful image that the country wishes to convey, in a context of rejection of militarism and power politics adopted following the Second World War and embodied in Article 9 of the Constitution, which prohibits war and the use of force.<sup>20</sup>

The trauma of the WWII was also at the root of a popular aversion to any use of force in Germany. This "culture of military restraint,"<sup>21</sup> in the words of former Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, is reflected in the Federal Republic's support for disarmament policy since its ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).<sup>22</sup> It is also more diffusely present in public opinion in countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Scandinavia, where societies have become "post-military" and tend to reject any war logic and any symbol of military power.<sup>23</sup>

*"Good international citizen"*

#### Disarmament to support international institutions

Middle powers often seek to increase their security through political and military alliances. According to the liberal school of thought, they also have an interest in strengthening an international system built on law and institutions. Such a system is necessary to promote the equality of nations regardless of their military power and to refrain from over-arming themselves.<sup>24</sup> Arms control and disarmament are two means to achieve that goal and fall fully within this framework, as evidenced by the efforts of Canada and Sweden in this regard. For both countries, the aim is to promote the effectiveness of the regimes, their functioning, and the implementation of standards. Their involvement in that field show their rejection of a world order-based power relations and nuclear arms races.<sup>25</sup>

As with other middle powers, the traditionally active disarmament policy of Stockholm and Ottawa illustrates, more broadly, a foreign policy that gives the UN a prominent place. The multilateral system, as a conflict regulation

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<sup>19</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>20</sup> Mataka Kamiya, "Realistic Proactivism: Japanese Attitudes Toward Global Zero", in Barry M. Blechman and Alexander K. Bollfrass, eds., *National Perspectives on Nuclear Disarmament*, Stimson Center, March 2010.

<sup>21</sup> Jochen Bittner, "Rethinking German Pacifism", *The New York Times*, 4 November 2013.

<sup>22</sup> Harald Müller, "Nuclear Weapons and German Interests: An Attempt at Redefinition", *PRIF-Report*, n° 55, 2000.

<sup>23</sup> Martin Shaw, *Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1991.

<sup>24</sup> Dario Battistella, *Théories des relations internationales*, Paris : Sciences Po, Les Presses, 2012.

<sup>25</sup> Una Becker-Jakob, Gregor Hofmann, Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, op. cit.

mechanism, that produces international law is a guarantor of their security. It reflects a trust in a collaborative world that respects the main principles of law.<sup>26</sup>

The importance of norms and a rule-based order is also mentioned by smaller powers such as Austria or Switzerland, for whom it is a real guarantee of security, especially since they do not belong to military alliances. In this context, the strict application of a treaty such as the NPT is seen as a security necessity, which justifies investment to achieve progress on all three pillars.<sup>27</sup> For these states, the credibility of the regime is indeed at stake as long as nuclear-weapon states do not demonstrate their sincere commitment to disarmament.<sup>28</sup>

### The pride of being "virtuous"

The desire to be a good international citizen does not only stem from a liberal vision of security. It is also explained by the constructivist school. Indeed, some theorists have insisted on the willingness of some States to place themselves in a constructive and positive position, insisting on the bonds of solidarity of the international community and trying to propose acceptable solutions to the problems of all. This virtuous positioning is consistent with the values professed by certain states, for example in Scandinavia, and helps to reinforce their respective identities. This quest for conformity is a fundamental interest to strengthen the sense of belonging and cohesion, but also to develop a form of collective pride and self-esteem.<sup>29</sup> Maintaining this sense of pride can be part of the political strategy: for example, Pierre-Elliott Trudeau's disarmament and peace initiative may have been partly calculated to strengthen Canadian cohesion in a context of high tensions caused by Quebec separatism.<sup>30</sup>

This identity is often linked to other elements: for example, New Zealand's positioning is associated with a global pride in being a leading country in terms of progress, with early policies in terms of women's rights, welfare state, the environment, and respect for indigenous peoples. New Zealanders therefore expect to play a progressive role on the international stage and to participate in the creation of a just order.<sup>31</sup>

Former Costa Rican President Óscar Arias acknowledged that Costa Rican disarmament policy was a way to increase its prestige, and to promote a foreign policy based on peace, morality and dignity.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, *A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada and Disarmament, 1945-1988*, Presses de l'Université Laval, Quebec City, 1989.

<sup>27</sup> Disarmament, non-proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

<sup>28</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>29</sup> Jacques E. C. Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.

<sup>30</sup> Paul Meyer, "Pierre Trudeau and the "Suffocation" of the Nuclear Arms Race", *Simons Papers in Security and Development*, n° 52/2016, August 2016.

<sup>31</sup> Lyndon Burford, op. cit.

<sup>32</sup> Katherine Stanley, "Arias Seeks Disarmament Abroad", *The Tico Times*, 16 February 2017.

## ***An emphasis on humanitarian issues***

### *An example of policy in favor of humanitarian law*

#### Promoting humanitarian law on the international scene

Switzerland was one of the first states to raise the issue of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons at the 2012, 2013 and 2014 NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committees (PrepCom) meetings. This interest is not surprising coming from a country that has focused its foreign policy on humanitarian issues since the end of the Cold War, and is used to interacting with major humanitarian law institutions, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, based in Geneva, but also the Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations Human Rights Council, UNIDIR, WILPF or ICAN.

As such, some disarmament actors are also involved in other areas of humanitarian law: Canada was very active on the Ottawa Treaty and is involved in the fight against trafficking of small arms. Costa Rica has been one of the strongest supporters of the Arms Trade Treaty. Norway has played a key role in the conclusion and universalization of a convention on cluster munitions. Austria participated actively in the negotiation of these three Treaties. Vienna also supports the efforts of the United Nations and the Red Cross to combat the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.<sup>33</sup>

At the level of non-state actors, the link between disarmament and humanitarian law is sometimes close, since several organizations have been able to work on the whole spectrum of disarmament (Norwegian People's Aid, Article 36, PAX). At the personal level, some members of the militant community have worked on several advocacy campaigns (Sylvie Brigot, for example, was Director of Amnesty International France and currently leads the French section of ICAN).

#### Promoting a "moral" policy

More broadly, some key individuals engaged in this movement are working for disarmament with the broader objective of pursuing a "moral" policy. According to the definition given by Gareth Evans, states like Australia that claim to be "good international citizens" must take into account ethical considerations and the common good, without limiting themselves to their own national interests "limited" to prosperity and security.<sup>34</sup>

This positioning may be old. For example, in Sweden, some noted the influence of Protestant ethics and an awareness of social issues, which are important to the whole political sphere and mark a common social democratic heritage. Some of Sweden's claimed values such as solidarity, equality, consensus-building and

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<sup>33</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>34</sup> Gareth Evans, "Good International Citizenship: Values and Interests in Foreign Policymaking", Address by Professor the Hon Gareth Evans to Sydney University Law School, 27 August 2015.

justice, as well as a "missionary instinct" would be particularly visible in its historical disarmament efforts.<sup>35</sup>

It is sometimes more recent and bears the mark of charismatic figures like Nelson Mandela in South Africa: the country has claimed an interest in humanitarian issues by embracing the legacy of the first post-apartheid President associated with a policy of civilian protection, responsibility towards future generations and development.<sup>36</sup>

The consideration of "morality" is also visible in nuclear-weapon countries such as the United States. Under the Obama presidency, Washington defended the idea of accountability and the necessity for a "respectable state" to commit itself to the elimination of nuclear weapons.<sup>37</sup> For many Western European countries, these weapons have acquired a negative connotation and governments wish to be involved as little as possible for fear of damaging their international image.<sup>38</sup>

### *Moral, ethics and religion*

#### The case of the Holy See and the Catholic Church

The Catholic Church positioned itself relatively early in the debate on the morality of deterrence, with a 1963 encyclical. In that document, the Pope called for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons while recognizing a provisional legitimacy to deterrence in the context of the opposition between the Western bloc and the totalitarian and imperialist Soviet regime.<sup>39</sup> This position was reiterated in particular in the 1980s with the publication of a pastoral letter from the American bishops.<sup>40</sup> It evolved with the end of the Cold War. Currently, the Vatican considers that nuclear deterrence no longer has legitimacy and strongly supports the process of banning nuclear weapons.<sup>41</sup>

In the case of the Holy See, the main mission is to guide a faithful community to make moral choices. The case of the Catholic Church is particularly interesting since the Holy See is a sovereign state that participates in diplomatic negotiations. It is also worth noting the involvement of many other branches of Christianity in

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<sup>35</sup> Una Becker-Jakob, Gregor Hofmann, Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, op. cit.

<sup>36</sup> Carmen Wunderlich, Andrea Hellmann, Daniel Müller, Judith Reuter and Hans-Joachim Schmidt, "Non-aligned Reformers and Revolutionaries: Egypt, South Africa, Iran and North Korea", in Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich (eds.), op. cit.

<sup>37</sup> Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, "The Logic of Zero", *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 2008.

<sup>38</sup> Hugh Chalmers, Malcolm Chalmers and Andrea Berger, "A Problem Deferred? NATO's Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons after Chicago", *RUSI*, Whitehall Report 4-12, October 2012.

<sup>39</sup> *Pacem In Terris*, Encyclical Letter of the Supreme Pontiff John XXIII, On Peace among All Nations, Based on Truth, Justice, Charity, Liberty, 11 April 1963.

<sup>40</sup> "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response", A Pastoral Letter on War and Peace by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 3 May 1983.

<sup>41</sup> Gerard Powers, "From Nuclear Deterrence to Disarmament: Evolving Catholic Perspectives", *Arms Control Today*, May 2015.

the discussion on the ethics of deterrence. Many Christian NGOs are also advocating nuclear disarmament.<sup>42</sup>

The voice of the Holy See retains a moral influence on the diplomacy of a number of predominantly Catholic states, particularly in South America, and can therefore be a source of motivation to promote disarmament.<sup>43</sup>

### The prohibition of nuclear weapons in the Iranian theology

Other states reject nuclear weapons for religious reasons, and in particular the Iranian Islamic regime. Indeed, Ayatollah Khamenei issued a fatwa in 2004 indicating that nuclear weapons were immoral and contrary to Islam. In 2005, an official of the regime stated in Vienna that "*the production, stockpiling or use of nuclear weapons is prohibited by Islam*".<sup>44</sup> For Shia theologians, the religious prohibition, which has its source in sacred texts, is justified by the immorality of weapons that necessarily cause innocent victims.

The Iranian regime, while challenging the norms of the world nuclear order, continues to call for complete disarmament. Nevertheless, ethical arguments are rarely used by Tehran, which is more in line with the arguments of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and uses its anti-nuclear discourse to attack Washington.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, they have been thwarted by the regime's proliferating activities until recent years.

### Religious NGOs at the forefront of the abolitionist struggle

Many religious thinkers, especially in the 20th century, emphasized the pacifist or humanist messages carried by their faith. In this context, reflections were held on the conditions for a just war and on the acceptability of certain weapons. While the official branches of the churches have often been relatively measured in their criticism of deterrence, at least during the Cold War, schools emphasizing pacifism over other values such as self-defense have condemned more strongly nuclear weapons. Religious NGOs quickly emerged with a militant stance: IKV in the Netherlands, Pax Christi in France, Sōka Gakkai and Nipponzan Myohoji in Japan. For these actors, ethical considerations are fundamental and are based on a set of ideological thoughts mixing individual and collective preferences that reject armed confrontation, violence and power relations.

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<sup>42</sup> Emmanuelle Maitre, "Morality of deterrence: religious perspectives", *Recherche & Documents, FRS*, n° 04/2016, July 2016.

<sup>43</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>44</sup> "Iran's statement at the IAEA emergency meeting", *Mehr News Agency*, 20 August 2015.

<sup>45</sup> General Debate Statement by Head of the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran H. E. Ambassador Reza Najafi Permanent Representative to United Nations & other International organizations in Vienna, Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, 24 April 2018.

## *Health considerations and protection of populations*

### The heritage of nuclear tests

While some "abolitionist" NGOs are known to shift from civil to military anti-nuclear combat because of their fear of damage to human health and the environment (Greenpeace, in particular), some states are also sensitive to this issue. For several states, the environmental argument is the basis of their disarmament diplomacy. This is the case for countries whose inhabitants have been victims of radioactive pollution, including the test campaigns conducted by nuclear-weapon states. Thus, Kazakhstan clearly places its disarmament initiatives in line with the efforts made at the end of the Soviet era to dismantle the Semipalatinsk test site. Undoubtedly, the unpopularity of nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan is linked to the health consequences of the 456 tests conducted in the country.<sup>46</sup> But according to its President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the country's motivations for getting involved in this struggle go further, since he describes in his book *Epicenter of Peace* a visceral attachment of the Kazakh people to their ancestral land. This fusional link between the nomadic people of the steppes and their motherland would be at the root of their repugnance for a weapon that could inflict deep and lasting damage on them.<sup>47</sup>

### Fear of radioactive pollution

Even when they have not been the main motivation of pro-disarmament activists, nuclear tests have regularly been an engine of popular, political and diplomatic mobilization, creating a sense of outrage over environmental and health risks as well as over encroachment of sovereignty. In this respect, it should be noted that the virtual disappearance of nuclear tests coincided with the end of the major popular movements challenging the weapon.

In New Zealand, the popular uproar against French nuclear tests in the Pacific forced political parties to show a façade opposition to the nuclear policies of its allies. This popular sentiment was then utilized by the Labour Party for electoral reasons, among others, before becoming a real conviction for elected officials on both sides of the political spectrum. Political involvement at the highest level to condemn the tests, and the refusal to accept visits of allied ships potentially carrying nuclear weapons, have made it possible to internalize the anti-nuclear norm. This policy has shaped the perspective of generations of people and officials, increasingly committed to disarmament, both within the population and within the bureaucracy in charge of these issues.<sup>48</sup> In Australia too, the nuclear tests played a role in popular mobilization, although the government remained more nuanced to preserve its strong links with Washington.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Toghyan Kassenova, "The lasting toll of Semipalatinsk's nuclear testing", *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 28 September 2009.

<sup>47</sup> Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Epicenter of Peace*, Zhibek Zholy, Almaty, 2010.

<sup>48</sup> Lyndon Burford, op. cit.

<sup>49</sup> Naoki Kamimura, "Civil Society, Nuclear Disarmament, and the U.S. Alliance: The Cases of Australia, New Zealand and Japan", *East-West Center Working Papers*, n° 8, October 2004.



## **A "convergence of struggles" of non-state actors in favor of nuclear disarmament**

### *The different aspirations of anti-nuclear activists*

#### Secondary and indirect activism

For non-state actors, motivations can be studied from an individual perspective, by looking at the reasons that push activists to dedicate time and energy to this struggle, or collectively, by observing the objectives of groups active in this field. Personal motivations fall within the scope of sociology and have been the subject of several studies.<sup>50</sup> At the collective level, pacifist and humanitarian considerations prevail. Indeed, many NGOs are only interested in nuclear disarmament in an indirect way. This is particularly the case with pacifist associations, such as WILFPF or Pax Christi, now mainly involved in the issue of disarmament, or the World beyond War network, which is closely involved in this issue. For others, it is above all the ecological risk that arouses a desire to promote disarmament. Many NGOs have been involved in the struggle against nuclear testing and are known for their global fight against the use of atomic energy, whether at the civilian or military level. In this context, Greenpeace, of course, but also local NGOs can sometimes - but relatively rarely - be inspired by NIMBY concerns. In addition to these main sources of anti-nuclear engagement, extreme left-wing and anti-globalization currents (such as ATTAC) particularly challenge nuclear weapons as a privilege of a few states with imperialist practices, and target in particular the United States.

#### Abolition as the main advocacy

Campaigns organized or supported by these thematic networks are joined by NGOs whose sole purpose is nuclear disarmament. The latter have various profiles. Some have been founded by scientists who have worked on nuclear energy and perceived the dangers of this technology (Federation of American Scientists, Pugwash, Union of Concerned Scientists), or by doctors concerned about the consequences of radiation (IPPNW). Others were founded by former political leaders marked by the fear of a nuclear conflict (Global Zero).

Since 2007, and the creation of ICAN in Melbourne, a network that now includes the main anti-nuclear NGOs, the advocacy rhetoric has been oriented towards human rights by showing the common ground between the fight against nuclear weapons and the campaigns that led to the prohibition of chemical weapons, anti-personnel mines or cluster munitions. By focusing on the consequences of radiation, or the global impact of a nuclear confrontation, militant organizations have therefore primarily paired the nuclear disarmament debate to the protection of populations and the law of armed conflict, moving further away from traditional pacifist discourses.

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<sup>50</sup> Lee Fox-Cardamone, Steve Hinkle and Mary Hogue, "The Correlates of Antinuclear Activism: Attitudes, Subjective Norms, and Efficacy", *Journal of Theoretical Social Psychology*, vol. 30, n° 3, March 2000.

## *The intertwining of state and non-state activism*

### Advocacy and awareness-raising

Whether working at the national or international level, NGOs play an important role in raising awareness among diplomats or politicians and convincing them to increase their commitment to nuclear disarmament. This work of influence naturally occurs in the context of traditional lobbying efforts towards leaders, elected officials or the general public. It is also visible in the advice provided to diplomats in the margins of disarmament forums, or in the integration of NGO representatives into national delegations. Training is also provided to officials by various organizations with known pro-disarmament sensitivities, such as the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in the United States and in Austria. However, influence can work both ways and some states do not hesitate to mobilize NGOs with whom they regularly work to relay their political priorities.

### An electoral motivation

Liberal democracy cannot ignore public opinion when it is particularly vocal on this issue. The main objective of some policies is therefore to gain public support and win electoral contests. The conversion of the New Zealand Labour Party, and later the Conservative Party, to the anti-nuclear cause was probably largely motivated by the desire to court constituencies that had become very assertive on this issue<sup>51</sup>.

It is often difficult to discern the intimate conviction of a political leader from what is done for mere political purposes. For example, the 2010 German initiative at NATO to initiate the withdrawal of the B-61 from the European continent has often been described as a personal call of Minister Westerwelle.<sup>52</sup> Similarly, Kazakhstan's investment in disarmament could be attributed to Nursultan Nazarbayev's personal desire to appear in a favorable light.<sup>53</sup> The shift in Swiss policy under Micheline Calmy-Rey, Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs from 2003 to 2011 (with active support for the recognition of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons), has been described as mainly motivated by an electoral desire to attract media attention and present government policy in a positive light.<sup>54</sup> Except when personal memoirs are published, or based on candid interviews, it is difficult to know to what extent such positioning is linked to intimate convictions or political calculations to court antinuclear public. However, it is logical that population's preferences eventually find an echo with their leaders in a democracy, and it is useful to note that the positions initially

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<sup>51</sup> Lyndon Burford, op. cit.

<sup>52</sup> James W. Davis and Ursula Jasper, "Non-strategic nuclear weapons as a 'Trojan horse': explaining Germany's ambivalent attitude", *European Security*, vol. 23, n° 1, 2014.

<sup>53</sup> Stephen F. Burgess and Togzhan Kassenova, "The Rollback States: South Africa and Kazakhstan", in Tanya Ogilvie-White and David Santoro, eds., *Slaying the Nuclear Dragon: Disarmament Dynamics in the Twenty-First Century*, University of Georgia Press, Macon, 2012.

<sup>54</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

defended by "populism" can be preserved by a "rhetorical trap" before changing perceptions, leading to a reformulation of the national interest and generating initiatives motivated by personal convictions within the administration and politicians.<sup>55</sup>

On the other hand, some countries, such as Japan, are characterized by a strong dichotomy between the preferences of the population and governments.<sup>56</sup> A majority of Japanese people support the cause of disarmament and have been involved in many anti-nuclear campaigns for decades. The government has therefore become accustomed to speaking out in favor of disarmament and has launched several initiatives in this regard. Nevertheless, the political class remains very unconvinced by the concrete steps to reduce nuclear arsenals, as evidenced by Tokyo's opposition to the Obama administration's proposal to commit to the no-first-use of nuclear weapons.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Lyndon Burford, op. cit.

<sup>56</sup> Nobuyasu Abe, "No First Use: How to Overcome Japan's Great Divide", *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, vol. 1, n° 1, 2018.

<sup>57</sup> "Abe tells U.S. of Japan's concerns over 'no first use' nuke policy being mulled by Obama", *The Japan Times*, 16 August 2016.



## Disarmament diplomacy as a niche diplomacy

On the basis of diverse and occasionally shared and intimate convictions, some actors, in particular states, have a particular interest in specializing in disarmament policy. Indeed, it can potentially become a source of expertise and influence on the international scene. A source of prestige, the establishment of such a "niche" diplomacy also makes it possible to exploit the mechanisms of multilateral diplomacy to effectively advance national positions. For states that fit this pattern, the historical continuity and influence of certain personalities can also play a major role.

### ***An effort to gain visibility on the international scene***

#### *Niche diplomacy to secure attention*

##### A way to exercise international responsibilities

The concept of niche diplomacy describes the phenomenon observed among certain middle powers which, lacking the resources to play a major role across the diplomatic field, select certain subjects on which they are able to have a tangible impact according to their interests and assets.<sup>58</sup> Anti-nuclear militancy has been the subject of niche diplomacy for some states.<sup>59</sup> It has opened doors for them and served as a springboard to gain preeminence in the international scene. Thus, Wellington's position was considered important in the country's election to the Disarmament Conference or the United Nations Security Council (1993-1994, 2015-2016). As Canadian Foreign Minister during the Cold War, Howard Charles Green believed that disarmament forums could offer Ottawa "*prestige and influence*".<sup>60</sup>

Participating in the *New Agenda Coalition* (NAC) or taking the initiative on a project like the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is also a way to demonstrate its ability to influence the international system and claim leadership on the international scene, an asset that probably plays a full part in Brazil's relatively recent positioning on these issues.<sup>61</sup> This dynamic stance on multilateral issues may have seemed all the more necessary following the democratization of the country, in order to restore its credibility and mark its full reintegration into the international system.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Andrew F. Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1997.

<sup>59</sup> Emmanuelle Maitre, "Nuclear diplomacy: a niche diplomacy for middle powers", *Research & Documents*, FRS, n° 08/2018, 2018.

<sup>60</sup> Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, op. cit.

<sup>61</sup> Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, "The Brazilian Way", *The Non-proliferation Review*, vol. 17, n° 3, November 2010.

<sup>62</sup> Carlo Patti, "Brazil and the nuclear issues in the years of the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva government (2003-2010)", *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol. 53, n° 2, 2010.

The concept of niche diplomacy is similar to the "signature policies" adopted by Dublin, which include disarmament. This notion is intimately linked to the national community's shared vision and identity, as recently suggested by the Irish Foreign Minister, for whom foreign policy "*is a showcase of who we are as a people*".<sup>63</sup>

### A means of obtaining a greater presence on the regional and global scenes

Disarmament expertise and activism can also provide opportunities for regional leadership. Thus, on the African continent, South Africa has clearly positioned itself as a leader on nuclear issues: by hosting the regional atomic energy commission (AFCONE), by assisting African states in the implementation of their non-proliferation obligations, and by conducting awareness-building campaigns in support of disarmament initiatives.<sup>64</sup> Within the Arab League and the NAM, Egypt also has this type of ambition and is building its influence through its regular investment in disarmament issues. Also present within the NAC, it acts as a spokesperson for dissatisfied stakeholders within the NPT and uses its role as a protestor to maintain regional leadership on other issues.<sup>65</sup> In Asia, such role can be fulfilled by Indonesia or Malaysia, or even Thailand, which have the opportunity to serve as inspirations and "models" for the rest of the region while highlighting their experience with the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.

For countries unfamiliar with exerting great influence on a global scale, disarmament diplomacy remains an opportunity to exist and showcase their values by exploiting the multilateral system, and in particular the United Nations General Assembly, which promotes the equality of each state and working in coalition. This type of motivation is present for countries such as Austria, Ireland, New Zealand and Costa Rica. Thus, former President Arias indicated that the policy he had pursued offered his country "*prestige and dignity*", considering that this commitment to disarmament now allowed Costa Rica to "*have a foreign policy*".<sup>66</sup> For Austria, some noted that by leading the crusade for the TPNW, the country had considerably increased its prestige in a large number of states, and that to some extent "*the Nobel Peace Prize [awarded to ICAN in 2017] also belonged to Austria*".<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Mary Miniham, "First major review of foreign priorities in 20 years highlights five signature Irish policies", *The Irish Times*, 14 January 2015.

<sup>64</sup> Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, "South Africa's Post-apartheid Nuclear Diplomacy: Practice and Principles", *Insight on Africa*, vol. 7, n° 2, 19 June 2015.

<sup>65</sup> Carmen Wunderlich, Andrea Hellmann, Daniel Müller, Judith Reuter and Hans-Joachim Schmidt, op. cit.

<sup>66</sup> Katherine Stanley, op. cit.

<sup>67</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

## *The benefits of coalition and mediation diplomacy*

### A factor of integration into a community of like-minded states

The willingness to join a community of states sharing values and objectives can be observed in the field of disarmament as soon as a decision is taken not to embark on or renounce a nuclear program.<sup>68</sup> This is particularly the case for a country like Kazakhstan, which from the outset has chosen to be part of the international community's "respectable" states<sup>69</sup>.

Many examples demonstrate a willingness to use this policy to integrate into coalition dynamics. Cooperation, partnership building and addressing interdependencies are principles that have been promoted by the South African regime since the end of Apartheid. In this context, disarmament is also a means for Pretoria to strengthen its relations with key states on the African continent but also outside.<sup>70</sup> Seen from Brasilia, the adoption of a radical stance on disarmament makes it possible to demonstrate its foreign policy of strengthening South-South partnerships and in particular to enhance its relations with certain key emerging powers such as India, South Africa and Iran.<sup>71</sup>

Multilateral mechanisms promote the creation of coalitions, the formation of regional groupings or of like-minded groups. This is particularly true for non-proliferation and disarmament, where *ad hoc* coalitions (NAC, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative or NPDI, Vienna Group of 10) or well-known organizations (Arab League, European Union, NAM, Scandinavian countries, African countries, etc.) are called upon to defend positions at major forums and often play important roles in negotiating an outcome document. Participating in these coalitions, in particular by engaging in groups such as the NAC (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, Slovenia) or NPDI (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey, United Arab Emirates) helps to reinforce the weight of its national preferences and to gain influence. This is a classic strategy of action to implement niche diplomacy for a middle power identified in the literature.<sup>72</sup>

Collective dynamics are very strong in this area and the "tribunician" character of multilateral forums can have ripple and rallying effects. These dynamics push some actors to support approaches in order not to remain isolated or attract criticism from their coalition partners.<sup>73</sup> This logic can also result in peer pressure when a state does not act in accordance with expectations. As a member of the NAM, South Africa was highly criticized for its role at the 1995 NPT Review

<sup>68</sup> Maria Rost Rublee, *Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint*, Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2009.

<sup>69</sup> Stephen F. Burgess and Togzhan Kassenova, op. cit.

<sup>70</sup> Sarah J. Swart, "An African contribution to the nuclear weapons debate", *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 97, n° 899, 2015.

<sup>71</sup> Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, op. cit.

<sup>72</sup> Andrew F. Cooper, op. cit.

<sup>73</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

Conference. The radicalism that has since been displayed is partly linked to the desire to no longer be considered a "lackey" of the Western powers and to preserve a leadership role within the NAM.<sup>74</sup>

### The posture of bridge-builder

Beyond the leadership role, disarmament diplomacy can also be used as a way to create compromise, particularly in the context of the NPT. Thus, the concept of "bridge-builder" is regularly mentioned by states that wish to maintain good relations with both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states and that pride themselves on playing a constructive role in disarmament. The Republic of South Africa in the Mandela era claimed this role because of its particular position: a Southern state that had a nuclear program and had privileged relations with several nuclear-weapon states. In Europe and Asia too, this vector is chosen as a way of integrating itself into the international debate by trying to satisfy the political preferences of the population while maintaining good relations with nuclear allies. Such a willingness is perceived in Germany, Japan, or Australia. This was reflected in the creation of NPDI in 2010, a coalition formed to find compromise measures and put in place concrete proposals for disarmament.

### ***Expert actors on nuclear issues***

*An expertise often forged through history and circumstances*

#### Expertise derived from national choices

Niche diplomacy is generally bolstered by a specific form of legitimacy. Thus, states involved in that field usually have a special expertise in disarmament. For those actors, causes and consequences are mixed to develop an active disarmament diplomacy. If the construction of an effective and competent bureaucratic machine on nuclear issues seems to be a product of an active policy on this subject, it can over time, become the trigger for initiatives. An actor is indeed likelier to engage in a subject if it has assets to deal with the issues and has invested in an area that can thus be "made profitable". Thus, for example, Canada's diplomatic community, which has been aware of nuclear-related scientific and technological issues since the Manhattan Project, has subsequently become known for its expertise in disarmament verification, a subject on which it remains a recognized player.<sup>75</sup>

South Africa is famous for having converted its knowledge about nuclear technology gleaned from its national weapons program into a diplomatic arsenal for disarmament promotion, but states such as Sweden, Switzerland, Japan and Argentina have also been able to use nuclear expertise, obtained in civil or military work, to take action in disarmament fora. In some cases, these skills may

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<sup>74</sup> Rian Leith and Joelen Pretorius, "Eroding the Middle Ground: The Shift in Foreign Policy Underpinning South African Nuclear Diplomacy", *Politikon*, vol. 36, n° 3, December 2009.

<sup>75</sup> "Canada's views on nuclear disarmament verification – Executive Summary", United Nations, Geneva, 2017.



also be sought from non-state actors, whose experts may be very influential in advising state delegations in various disarmament forums.

It should be noted that as far as civil society is concerned, expertise is also at the origin of mobilization insofar as the nuclear physicists who worked on the American program were among the first to demand the elimination of weapons through the FAS. Other groups of specialists have emerged, such as the *Union of Concerned Scientists*, *Scientists for Global Survival*, *Scientists against Nuclear Arms*, the Pugwash movement, but also doctors concerned about the consequences of radiation (IPPNW, *Physicians for Social Responsibility*, *Physicians for Global Survival...*).<sup>76</sup>

Finally, and less clearly, expertise on nuclear issues can be a matter of circumstance. Thus, the location in Vienna of institutions such as the IAEA and the CTBTO is not the cause of current Austrian policy but may have justified a continued interest in these subjects.<sup>77</sup>

### Expertise derived from tests and explosions

In general, nuclear testing has been an important factor in popular mobilization against nuclear weapons. With the support of citizen movements, several states have concentrated much of their diplomatic involvement on the issue of testing. Today, several communities remain very involved in this subject, and for some countries, the fight for disarmament is above all a means of shedding light on the negative individual and collective consequences of the tests. Kazakhstan is particularly well known in this category with campaigns orchestrated at the highest level to denounce nuclear tests and call for their complete cessation. For example, President Nazarbayev created the ATOM movement against testing and worked for the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of an international day against nuclear testing.<sup>78</sup>

Motivated by similar concerns, the Marshall Islands are mobilizing around active diplomacy, including through legal channels. Thus, the archipelago launched a procedure in 2015 before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Three recent cases have pitted the archipelago against India, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. These complaints were deemed inadmissible by the ICJ.<sup>79</sup> For the country, however, the issue of disarmament remains particularly sensitive: the late Tony deBrum, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and a founding father of the country, was an eyewitness to the 1954 test on Bikini Atoll. Many Marshals still live in

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<sup>76</sup> Lawrence Wittmer, op. cit.

<sup>77</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>78</sup> Togzhan Kassenova, op. cit. See also UNGA resolution 64/35, 2 December 2009, "International Day against Nuclear Tests".

<sup>79</sup> International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, Obligations relating to negotiations on cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament (Marshall Islands C. United Kingdom), Preliminary objections, Judgment of 5 October 2016.

exile after the radioactive pollution of their island or claim compensation from the American government for contamination.<sup>80</sup>

### *Technical expertise and leadership*

#### A means of influence with constituted Groups

Niche diplomacy on nuclear issues is therefore logically favored by specific skills. This offers the opportunity to demonstrate strong leadership to many states that do not have the means or choose not to invest in these issues. Among the expert states, Sweden is an interesting example where scientific and technical experts gave legitimacy to Swedish positions. For a long time, teams of diplomats have been trained in nuclear issues, including the most technical aspects, and have been able to provide useful assistance to other countries. This posture has generated confidence in Stockholm and has helped to enhance its international image.<sup>81</sup> Some Swedish personalities have distinguished themselves in this field and have played leading roles in international organizations, such as Alva Myrdal (Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament from 1962 to 1973 and Minister for Disarmament from 1967 to 1973), Inga Thorsson (Ambassador to the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament from 1974 to 1982), Sigvard Eklund (Director General of the IAEA from 1961 to 1981), Hans Blix (Director General of the IAEA from 1981 to 1997) and Rolf Ekéus (Director of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq from 1991 to 1997).<sup>82</sup>

Technical expertise makes it possible to have a strong power of conviction in certain groups such as the NAM, the Group of 77 or the Arab League, where few states have the means to build comprehensive arguments on technical subjects. Thus, actors such as South Africa, Iran or India have had a disproportionate role in the positioning of NAMs over the years.<sup>83</sup> Egypt, for its part, has been the driving force behind the Arab League's thinking through the preservation of a team of well-trained diplomats on these issues. For these middle powers, maintaining technical know-how is therefore an interesting way to weigh in and increase their respective leverage on international forums. It should be noted that many states remain far behind on global security in general and nuclear disarmament in particular, which is far from their immediate priorities. Thus, and in particular among the NAMs or the Group of 77, it is possible to gather the support of many states on pro-disarmament positions by evoking shared values (justice, development, peace) and by providing technical advice.

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<sup>80</sup> Nina Tannenwald, "Normative Strategies for disarmament", in Nik Hynek and Michal Smetana (eds), *Global Nuclear Disarmament, Strategic, Political and regional perspectives*, Routledge, New York, 2016, p. 115.

<sup>81</sup> Una Becker-Jakob, Gregor Hofmann, Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, op. cit.

<sup>82</sup> Benjamin Hautecouverture, "Non-prolifération et désarmement : Le désarmement nucléaire et les politiques de sécurité en Suède (1946-1975)", *CESIM Historical Note*, June 2007.

<sup>83</sup> William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, *Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement: Principles vs Pragmatism*, Adelphi Series, vol. 51, n° 427, 2011.

### The "personal" diplomacy of some experts

In some cases, some diplomats have a real influence on their government's policy and are able to express their personal preferences, visions and even ideology. These influential personalities are often diplomats who hold key positions for a long time, for example as head of delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. We can think in particular of Alva Myrdal, already mentioned, for Sweden, Abdul Minty, for South Africa, or more recently Alexander Kmentt, for Austria and Alfonso García Robles and Jorge Lomónaco for Mexico, who have left their mark on their states' policies. While these diplomats are regularly driven by strong convictions, career and prestige considerations should not be overlooked:<sup>84</sup> at the individual level as well, mobilizing morals and ethics and being noticed for activism can lead to valued personal recognition and appreciation.<sup>85</sup>

Mexican Alfonso García Robles is known as a diplomat who turned disarming into a personal struggle. Qualified as "obsessed with disarmament," he had a deep impact on his country's diplomacy in this field by holding key positions, particularly in Geneva, for several decades.<sup>86</sup> His activism earned him considerable international recognition and his efforts were crowned by the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982, an additional motivating factor to remain involved in this cause.

The contemporary example of Alexander Kmentt (former Director of Disarmament Affairs in Vienna), Alexander Marschik (Political Director and Deputy Minister) and Thomas Hajnoczi (former Ambassador in Geneva) shows the role played by competent and dedicated officials in forming a committed team. Indeed, the three men have used their experiences in the field of disarmament to be effective and to rely on their networks. Mr. Kmentt has worked for more than fifteen years on these issues, an atypical situation at the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with positions in Geneva and the CTBTO. Mr. Marschik was Director of Disarmament when the issue of humanitarian consequences was raised. All three were also able to share their knowledge and experience in the negotiations on anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions.<sup>87</sup> Their combined skills and determination, supported at the political level, have enabled Austria to play an unprecedented role in the emergence of the TPNW.

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<sup>84</sup> Alisher Faizullaev, "Diplomacy and Self", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, vol. 17, n° 3, 2006.

<sup>85</sup> Jeremy Greenstock, "The Bureaucracy: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service, and Other Government Departments", in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur, eds, *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013.

<sup>86</sup> Alan Riding, "Man In The News; Stubborn Combatants In Disarmament's Cause: Alfonso Garcia Robles", *The New York Times*, 14 October 1982.

<sup>87</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

## *Path dependence and identity*

### The influence of great figures

Due to a particular expertise or following the investment of a key figure, pro-disarmament diplomacy is often characterized by a strong continuity. Thus, states that have marked the history of disarmament or non-proliferation generally try to retain influence in this field. This principle of continuity and coherence is not unique to this subject, but has been recognized as a general foreign policy objective.<sup>88</sup> Continuity is especially observed in countries where personality linked to the history of the country have acquired international fame for their work in favor of nuclear disarmament. In Mexico, the name of Alfonso García Robles, a diplomat awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, is regularly associated with the country's politics. Indeed, his legacy is so strong that many contemporary diplomats consider it essential to follow in his footsteps and follow his "doctrine" in favor of disarmament and non-proliferation.<sup>89</sup> Having left a mark on Mexican politics for several decades, García Robles has influenced generations of diplomats who continue his policy in an attempt to display for continuity and in the conviction that it is beneficial to Mexico's international image.<sup>90</sup>

In Dublin, the figure of Foreign Minister Frank Aiken (1957-1969) remains essential to understanding Irish diplomacy today. His role in the birth of the NPT and his legacy are systematically recalled by Irish diplomats and most recently at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference.<sup>91</sup> More modestly but also illustratively, Canada continues to invest heavily in a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a project strongly influenced by former Disarmament Ambassador Gerald Shannon. This continuity is also motivated by pragmatic reasons (the project seems to be the most promising in the list of "steps" advocated by advocates of gradual disarmament), but the historical and personal link is also significant.<sup>92</sup>

### Consistency and continuity

For some countries that have considered a nuclear program but have finally abandoned it, it is necessary to justify this often popular and logical choice and to build a narrative that values this decision. Restraint becomes a source of pride and

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<sup>88</sup> Janice Gross Stein, "Psychological Explanations of International Conduct", in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, Thomas Risse and Beth À Simmons, *Handbook of International Relations*, London, Sage Publication, 2006.

<sup>89</sup> Deepti Choubey, "The Nonproliferation Motivations of the Non-Aligned Movement", in Jeffrey R. Fields, ed. *State Behavior and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime*, University of Georgia Press, Macon, 2014.

<sup>90</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>91</sup> General Debate, Statement by Ambassador Michael Gaffey, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations and other International Organisations in Geneva at the 2018 Preparatory Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Geneva, 24 April 2018.

<sup>92</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

has led several states to present themselves as models. Sweden and Canada have played this card by presenting themselves as advocates for a world without nuclear weapons since (or even before for Sweden) their decision to permanently renounce a nuclear arsenal.<sup>93</sup>

This is even more true (but not systematic) for states that have abandoned a nuclear capability, such as South Africa, which has put forward this particular status to highlight its exemplarity, especially since the ruling party, the ANC, already denounced nuclear weapons at the time of its opposition to the Apartheid regime.<sup>94</sup> We can then speak of "path dependence": having renounced nuclear weapons almost definitively by signing the NPT and having affirmed their preference for a world without nuclear weapons, some actors have a clear interest in recalling this objective and in being consistent in their disarmament policies.

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<sup>93</sup> Lyndon Burford, *op. cit.*

<sup>94</sup> Stephen F. Burgess and Togzhan Kassenova, *op. cit.*



## Challenging nuclear hegemony

For some states, the issue of disarmament is not so much a niche policy as an element of a broader positioning on the international scene. This is particularly the case for those who use this struggle as a means of challenging the world nuclear order, and thereby challenging the foundations of the global system and its organization.

### ***The NAM's efforts to challenge an unequal order***

#### *Disarming to end a discriminatory situation*

##### Criticism from the outside

Some actors' commitment to the cause of disarmament is not particularly caused by a rejection of nuclear weapons, nor specifically to exercise niche diplomacy: an obvious motivation in some major countries of the South is in fact a challenge to the nuclear order as it was crystallized by the NPT during the Cold War. As with other factors, this motivation can combine calculated interests and values: for state actors in particular, it is often a question of increasing national power in the international system while working against what is perceived as an unfair order.

Some of these states have remained outside the NPT and have therefore considered that the Treaty is not adequate to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons because of its discriminatory status. This speech was long held by China before its ratification of the NPT. It is more emblematic today of India which, despite its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, has consistently held a pro-disarmament discourse since its independence. Inspired by Gandhi's rejection of nuclear weapons,<sup>95</sup> this policy has become a tradition affirmed by Prime Minister Nehru with proposals to end nuclear testing or fight proliferation.<sup>96</sup> The particularity of this discourse is the emphasis placed on the discriminatory nature of the NPT and the need to promote universal disarmament. India, for example, was the first to use the term "nuclear apartheid" and has consistently challenged standards considered unfair. This requirement is reflected in a 1978 statement by the Prime Minister to the United Nations, stating that "*our objection to the treaty is because it is so patently discriminatory*" but also a speech to the Parliament of Indira Gandhi in 1988, noting that "*it is only through nuclear disarmament that discrimination would be eliminated and equality between nations reestablished.*"<sup>97</sup> In response to this observation, Indian leaders considered that only efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their arsenals could restore equality of status among states and lead to general disarmament and peace.

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<sup>95</sup> Y. P. Anand, "What Mahatma Gandhi Said about the Bomb", New Delhi: National Gandhi Museum, 1998.

<sup>96</sup> Rajesh Basrur, "India and Nuclear Disarmament", *Security Challenges*, vol. 6, n° 4, Summer 2010.

<sup>97</sup> Priya Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004*, Routledge, Abington, 2012.

### Criticism from within

Within the regime too, many states deplore the existence of a fundamental inequality of status and demand that nuclear-weapon states abandon their arsenals in order to put an end to this injustice. Brazil is one of the countries using this argument. This is also the case for many members of the NAM, such as Iran, who are protesting against a treaty they deem "discriminatory".<sup>98</sup>

As such, it is noteworthy that for some states, particularly non-aligned states, there is little interest in proposals for arsenal reduction and preliminary steps towards disarmament, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the FMCT. Their main objective is to eliminate the difference in status, the volume of weapons and the policies related to their possession seem secondary if the ultimate goal of these measures is not clearly established as elimination.<sup>99</sup>

Even if its policy is quite different and promotes disarmament in stages, China can, since its accession to the NPT, be cited for its willingness to support to some extent the demands of non-aligned countries. As such, it develops a rhetoric clearly aiming at opposing the nuclear order perceived as modelled by the Western powers by supporting in its speeches a vision for universal disarmament and non-discriminatory non-proliferation measures.<sup>100</sup>

### *A contestation of intolerable privileges*

#### "Double standards": the case of Israel

For some actors, the NPT provisions are considered unfair, but the Treaty is above all denounced as a symbol of discrimination. This perception provokes indignation and leads to the promotion of disarmament in a spirit of protest. The Egyptian case is particularly interesting. In the 1970s, Egypt made the choice to oppose Israel's nuclear development through arms control and diplomacy, as it could not achieve parity at the military level. Thus, Cairo chose to sign the NPT quickly in the hope of setting a regional precedent. Its disarmament activism was therefore initially linked to the desire to put pressure on Israel. When this strategy failed, Egyptian diplomats focused their attention on the proposed Middle East weapons of mass destruction-free zone. The failure of this measure has created a lot of frustration and has led to strategy of blocking and contesting. Most importantly, Cairo continues to promote disarmament and denounce nuclear weapons in order to draw attention to the Israeli program and to show itself in a positive light compared to Tel Aviv. Egyptian activism is also a means of denouncing the injustices of the non-proliferation regime that allows a state like Israel to remain outside the NPT without being punished or even criticized.

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<sup>98</sup> Jeffrey R. Fields, *op. cit.*

<sup>99</sup> Jeffrey Knopf, "Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation: Examining the Linkage Argument", *International Security*, vol. 37, n° 3, hiver 2012-2013.

<sup>100</sup> Li Bin, "China and Global Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament", in *The War That Must Never Be Fought: Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence*, ed. George P. Shultz and James E. Goodby, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2015.



Tolerance of Israeli opacity is for Egypt a sign of a system that operates under the double standards and fundamentally refuses to consider sovereign states as equal and having the same rights.<sup>101</sup>

### "Double standards": the case of Iran

Iran, too, is a regular leader of the NAM and a contender of the world nuclear order. Its refusal to accept constraints on its nuclear developments and its failure to comply with its NPT commitments caused a crisis in the international system and isolated the regime until the signing of the JCPOA in 2015.

Nevertheless, Iran is one of the actors that shows a preference for disarming, a position claimed especially when Iran took the lead in the NAM between 2012 and 2013. On the one hand, Iran agrees with Egypt's criticism of the double standards and has notably considered that the nuclear-weapon states "were irresponsible" for not protesting against Tel Aviv, but also against New Delhi, for similar reasons.<sup>102</sup> But Tehran also draws on its national case to indicate that it is deeply unfair that states that do not comply with Article VI of the NPT can impose illegitimate constraints on other states. This symbolizes, according to Iranians the hegemonic politics of great powers and in particular of the United States, a domination contested more generally by Iranian revolutionary ideology.<sup>103</sup> The pursuit of a clandestine nuclear program has logically explained Iran's choice to insist on what is perceived in Tehran as the injustice of the international system.

### ***"Re-balancing the NPT" and opposing restrictions on access to technologies***

*The promotion of Article VI to correct a bias of the NPT*

#### Insisting on the implementation of the three pillars

For all states in favor of disarmament, and for almost all non-nuclear-weapon states, the main motivation for their efforts remains a preoccupation to implement the NPT in a balanced manner and in particular to ensure that all three pillars make progress. In all the speeches delivered at the major gatherings linked to this treaty (review conferences, preparatory committees), it is established that many efforts have been made to combat proliferation, to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy but that the disarmament pillar has not progressed enough.<sup>104</sup> This criticism grew in importance after the unlimited extension of the Treaty in 1995 and when the major reductions in nuclear arsenals observed at the end of the Cold

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<sup>101</sup> Carmen Wunderlich, Andrea Hellmann, Daniel Müller, Judith Reuter and Hans-Joachim Schmidt, op. cit.

<sup>102</sup> Carmen Wunderlich, "A 'Rogue' Gone Norm Entrepreneurial? Iran within the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime", in eds. Wolfgang Wagner, Wouter Werner and Michal Onderco, *Deviance in International Relations: "Rogue States" and International Security*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2014.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Jayantha Dhanapala and Tariq Rauf, *Reflections on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Review conferences and the future of the NPT*, SIPRI, updated in 2017.

War came to a halt. For many actors, therefore, and in particular for “following” states that join the initiatives launched by the most involved, there is a logic of justice: it is normal for all parties to the NPT to comply with their obligations and the efforts made by non-nuclear-weapon states, particularly in the field of non-proliferation, should find a counterpart in the implementation of Article VI by the nuclear-weapon states.<sup>105</sup> This feeling is amplified by the activism of nuclear-weapon states to develop additional non-proliferation standards that can be perceived as constraining and as guidelines that are seen as self-righteous.

For example, the President of Kazakhstan recently stated that the main problem of the NPT remained the lack of implementation of Article VI, and called on non-nuclear-weapon states to play a major role in disarmament by considering that prescriptions from nuclear-weapon states lack legitimacy, as they give the impression that the “patient is treating the doctor.”<sup>106</sup>

### A concern for justice in the implementation of the NPT

These efforts to “rebalance” the NPT by ensuring the fair application of its three pillars are not reserved to non-nuclear states. Thus, while the Obama administration's disarmament initiatives have been largely motivated by security and tactical arguments (see 4.3.1), there is no denying that some of their instigators were willing to restore a certain legitimacy to the regime and a genuine concern to improve it in a spirit of justice.<sup>107</sup> Similarly, the report published by the National Assembly in July 2018 shows that some French legislators believe that the French government must set an example in the field of disarmament not only by calculation but also to make a “fundamentally unequal” treaty more just.<sup>108</sup>

### *Disarmament as a “pretext” to block progress on non-proliferation?*

#### An opposition for commercial reasons

Brazil's situation is particularly interesting because its disarmament position is fairly recent and does not constitute an element of identity for the country: a military nuclear program was envisaged in the 1970s-1980s, the country only joined the NPT in 1998 and with strong parliamentary reluctance,<sup>109</sup> and it does not suffer from a nuclear “allergy” since it states ambitious objectives in terms of civil nuclear energy but also the use of nuclear propulsion for submarines. On the issue of the TPNW as well, Brazil has long hesitated about what to do. Brazil's main goal is to prevent any constraint on the development of its civilian program

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<sup>105</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>106</sup> Nursultan Nazarbayev, op. cit.

<sup>107</sup> Jason Enia, “Explaining Dynamics and Stasis in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: The Challenges of a Multiplicity of Public Goods”, in Jeffrey R. Fields, op. cit.

<sup>108</sup> Rapport d'information déposé en application de l'article 145 du règlement par la commission des affaires étrangères en conclusion des travaux d'une mission d'information constituée le 24 octobre 2017 (1) sur l'arme nucléaire dans le monde, 50 ans après l'adoption du Traité sur la non-prolifération nucléaire (TNP) Co-rapporteurs M. Michel Fanget et M. Jean-Paul Lecoq, 11 July 2018.

<sup>109</sup> Carlo Patti, op. cit.

and on technology transfers. Convinced that Western countries are seeking to preserve their commercial and technological monopolies, Brasilia believes that many non-proliferation rules aim only to restrict technological development in the global South. In concrete terms, Brazil fears that it will be prohibited from using its uranium resources for enrichment or from using highly enriched uranium to operate the reactors of its nuclear submarines for economic reasons. Faced with what it considers to be a lack of sincerity, Brazil does not hesitate to use the argument of the slow progress of disarmament to block additional steps on non-proliferation, and in an emblematic way to reject the generalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol. Indeed, some have argued that the Brazilian abolitionist stand is above all a pretext for making the adoption of new non-proliferation norms conditional on unrealistic disarmament efforts and thus effectively postponing it indefinitely.<sup>110</sup>

Brazil is not the only actor that has focused on disarmament to resist new non-proliferation norms that could harm its economic interests: the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1970s and 1980s challenged import restrictions while officially supporting the cause of disarmament.<sup>111</sup> Today, South Africa wants to exploit its uranium reserves and plans to resume enrichment on its territory. Pretoria therefore has an interest in emphasizing the importance of disarmament in relation to the other pillars of the NPT in order to avoid additional constraints on its civilian ambitions.<sup>112</sup> Finally, Iran is naturally in an ambiguous position. On the one hand, it emphasizes the conditional nature of the NPT, where, in its view, non-nuclear-weapon states are bound only because the nuclear-weapon states have an obligation to disarm. On the other hand, Tehran is very concerned about any attempt to limit what it considers its sovereign right to develop a civilian nuclear program, a request perceived with suspicion because of the regime's past activities in this field.<sup>113</sup>

### An opposition for reasons of sovereignty

While an economic calculation may be at stake in the criticism addressed to the NPT regime, motivation is sometimes a matter of sovereignty because the development of the full nuclear cycle for peaceful purposes is rarely profitable in the short term.

The Iranian proliferation crisis illustrated in its beginning the importance of the principle of sovereignty for many states that prefer to call for disarmament efforts rather than accept restrictions on their national development, even when such restrictions do not cause harm. For example, in the case of Iran, many states challenged the legitimacy of the sanctions on the grounds that Tehran was

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<sup>110</sup> Togzhan Kassenova, *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope, an Evolving Identity*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2014.

<sup>111</sup> Johannes Preisinger, "Germany and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Interim Assessment and Outlook", Bonn: Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy, Working Papers on International Politics, n° 76, July 1993.

<sup>112</sup> Wendell Roelf, "S. Africa considers nuclear fuel cycle facilities", *Reuters*, 2 April 2012.

<sup>113</sup> Carmen Wunderlich, "A 'Rogue' Gone Norm Entrepreneurial?", op. cit.

exercising its sovereign right to enrich uranium. South Africa has been among the reluctant states to condemn Iran's nuclear program until 2009, despite a desire to appear as a "good international citizen" and a strong interest in multilateralism.<sup>114</sup> Egypt also resists attempts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, and in particular has strongly opposed the Bush Administration's efforts to do so (2001-2009). Like many NAM countries, Egypt supports the right to develop the entire nuclear fuel cycle for all, including Tehran. This is noteworthy as Cairo has a security concern about the development of a nuclear military program in Iran. This posture illustrates the importance of the principle of sovereignty and the norm of justice in the political decision-making, which may in the Egyptian case contradict apparent security interests.<sup>115</sup> It should also be noted that the Egyptian stance has also been justified by greater ambitions in the development of a civilian or even military nuclear program.<sup>116</sup>

Outside the NPT, the issue of sovereignty is crucial for a country like India. New Delhi thus regularly repeats the rhetoric of the NAM and considers that there is not enough nuclear cooperation between the countries of the North and the South. Although seeking to be part of it, India criticizes control regimes that restrict access to technologies. In fact, its official position has changed little despite significant technological development. The country is no longer a mere nuclear importer but has *de facto* joined the small number of supplier states. Nevertheless, the founding ideology of the NAM remains strong in India and the fear of obstacles to sovereignty is a frequent and mobilizing narrative.<sup>117</sup>

## ***Fostering the voice of the South in global affairs***

### *Disarmament and the NAM principles*

#### Fighting against the imperialism of the P5

The guiding principles of the NAM are sovereignty, non-interference and anti-imperialism. Marked by the experience of colonialism, the movement insists on the need to compensate for centuries of exploitation and to unite to weigh more. Overall, the demands of the non-aligned countries are above all equal participation in world affairs, an emphasis on multilateralism, peaceful conflict resolution and general and complete disarmament.<sup>118</sup> With the end of the Cold War, development has also become a priority of the NAM.

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<sup>114</sup> Michal Onderco, "A battle of principles: South Africa's relations with Iran", *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, vol. 54, n° 2, 252-267, 2016.

<sup>115</sup> Carmen Wunderlich, Andrea Hellmann, Daniel Müller, Judith Reuter and Hans-Joachim Schmidt, op. cit.

<sup>116</sup> Bruno Tertrais, "Alternative Proliferation Futures for North Africa", in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., *The Next Arm Race*, Strategic Studies Institute Book, Carlisle, PA, July 2012.

<sup>117</sup> Marco Fey, Andrea Hellmann, Friederike Klinke, Franziska Plümmer and Carsten Rauch, "Established and Rising Great Powers: The United States, Russia, China, and India", in Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich (eds.), op. cit.

<sup>118</sup> Carmen Wunderlich, Andrea Hellmann, Daniel Müller, Judith Reuter and Hans-Joachim Schmidt, op. cit.

Several of the leading disarmament countries are members of the NAM and their activism is linked to the principles of the movement. Thus, the specific status of the P5 is incompatible with the idea of equality between states advocated by non-aligned countries. The fact that the club, that holds weapons prohibited to all other states and also has a permanent right of veto in the UN Security Council, is an additional element of animosity and frustration that feeds on a strong sense of injustice.<sup>119</sup>

Among these states, South Africa illustrates the conduct of a disarmament policy motivated by its fight against imperialism. From the time of Thabo Mbeki's presidency, the ANC's anti-imperialist ideology was further reflected in the country's foreign policy. As one of the leaders of the NAM, the country has thus deployed a more radical stance by displaying its conviction that it must fight against an international order deemed unfair and biased. While this position has been visible in several non-nuclear-related areas, the disarmament-non-proliferation balance has also been a subject on which Pretoria has sought to attack Western imperialism and its illegitimate domination on the world stage.<sup>120</sup> One of the objectives of this policy, clearly recalled by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2011, is thus to "*ensure that a rules-based system is established that limits the possibilities for unilateral action by the main powers*".<sup>121</sup> Indeed, Pretoria was criticized in 1995 when it supported the unlimited extension of the NPT: some blamed the government for advancing its economic interests with Western countries, rather than displaying solidarity with the group. The radicalization of its policy since then can be interpreted as a response to these reproaches and a desire to fully identify with the principles of the movement.<sup>122</sup>

In Asia, Malaysia has made itself known, in particular, through its fight for the signature by the nuclear-weapon states of the Protocols to the Bangkok Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in South-East Asia. The difficulties encountered in this field may have justified a desire to challenge more generally the predominant weight of the nuclear-weapon states in the world nuclear order, including in autonomous regional initiatives.<sup>123</sup>

Although not part of the NAM, China supports this major objective by trying to appear as a leader of the group: China has consistently criticized any measure perceived as imperialist in terms of deterrence and non-proliferation and tries to distinguish itself by a more conciliatory policy on the issue of disarmament, thereby courting the non-aligned.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Rian Leith and Joelen Pretorius, op. cit.

<sup>121</sup> Budget Vote Speech by Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Mr. Marius Fransman to the National Assembly, 31 May 2011.

<sup>122</sup> Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, "Chapter Six, South Africa and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", *South Africa's Nuclear Diplomacy, 1990-2010: Securing a Niche Role through Norm Construction and State Identity*, University of Pretoria, January 2013.

<sup>123</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>124</sup> Marc Finaud, "China and Nuclear Weapons: Implications of a No First Use Doctrine", *Asia Dialogue*, 3 April 2017.

Finally, this desire to rebalance and oppose the excessive weight of the superpowers can be combined with a particular challenge to the American power. states such as Iran are of course known for their specific denunciation of the American nuclear arsenal because of their deteriorated bilateral relationship with Washington. For others, such as Mexico, it may be politically appropriate to stand out from the United States and seek to embarrass a particularly cumbersome neighbor.<sup>125</sup> This will is illustrated today but finds a historical basis in the more reformist policy of President Adolfo López Mateos, with a rapprochement towards the NAM and a desire for greater autonomy vis-à-vis Washington.<sup>126</sup>

### Disarmament and development

The generally accepted empirical link between countries under nuclear protection and level of development (less relevant since India, Pakistan or North Korea joined the club) has led some to insist on the link between disarmament and development. Indeed, the exorbitant cost of nuclear weapons on a global scale is regularly recalled and compared to the budgets necessary to achieve the United Nations' development objectives.<sup>127</sup> Historically, churches have consistently condemned the "waste" of resources used for defense programs, and especially for nuclear armaments, rather than for social and economic projects.<sup>128</sup> states have also endorsed this narrative, particularly within the NAM, such as Indonesia, which introduced a draft resolution in 2017 in the First Committee of the United Nations entitled "Disarmament and Development", and Mexico. In general, this argument is very strong among many "followers" on nuclear issues, who believe that deterrence budgets would be better used to meet development objectives.<sup>129</sup>

### *The need for justice and the overhaul of the international system*

#### An attempt to build a fairer order

For those who support a radical approach to disarmament, there are fundamental links between power, inequality and nuclear violence. Resisting the nuclear powers is justified as a way to contest the repositories of power inherited from a militaristic, colonial and gendered structure. Nuclear inequalities are perceived as a reflection of socio-economic inequalities and must be addressed. Finally, nuclear violence is also seen as a reflection of global violence more generally.<sup>130</sup>

The Brazilian position is symptomatic of this perspective. The relatively radical position on disarmament, reflected in the efforts to achieve a successful

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<sup>125</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>126</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>127</sup> Randy Rydell, "A Strategic Plan for Nuclear Disarmament: Engineering a Perfect Political Storm", *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, vol. 1, n° 1, 2018.

<sup>128</sup> Gerard Powers, "Papal Condemnation of Nuclear Deterrence and What Is Next", *Arms Control Today*, May 2018.

<sup>129</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>130</sup> Nick Ritchie and Kjølsv Egeland, "The diplomacy of resistance: power, hegemony and nuclear disarmament", *Global Change, Peace & Security*, vol. 30, n° 2, 2018.

conclusion of the TPNW, in a strong criticism of the nuclear-weapon states, but also in a refusal to strengthen the non-proliferation regime until Article VI is better respected, is part of the redefinition of foreign policy objectives outlined by President Lula da Silva. It is consistent with the desire to amplify the voice of the South in the international system, reduce inequalities (within and outside the country), combat asymmetric relations with the major powers and promote a more just and representative order, including through the UN Security Council reform.<sup>131</sup> This Security Council question is essential because the challenge to the domination of the five nuclear-weapon states is often combined with their status as permanent members of the Security Council, a situation considered anachronistic. This type of motivation can be found in states such as Mexico, India and South Africa.

In addition to this global challenge, there is also a specific criticism of the way in which certain aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime are discussed and regulated. Indeed, some standards have been established by "cartels" of exporting countries or in formats in which Northern countries are over-represented. There is therefore a sense of injustice in the lack of representation of the countries of the global South in these forums and discussions.

Although countries like Austria do not recognize themselves in this discourse against the world order, they share ICAN's vision that nuclear risk can concern all humanity, it is logical that a solution should be found in a democratic manner and taking into account the voice of the non-nuclear-weapon states.<sup>132</sup>

### Disarmament and sovereignty

Moreover, opposition to nuclear weapons can be seen as a means of asserting its sovereignty: for example, Wellington's refusal to allow nuclear ships into its ports was justified by the desire to exercise its sovereign right,<sup>133</sup> while the challenge to the stationing of nuclear weapons in NATO countries was also justified by this type of argument. Paradoxically, clumsy or uncooperative responses from nuclear-weapon states may have fueled this opposition on the grounds of national sovereignty. Perhaps the most famous historical example is the French sabotage of the *Rainbow Warrior* in 1985 in the port of Auckland, which crystallized New Zealand's anti-nuclear opposition at the highest level. More recently, in 2017, information that the United States threatened Stockholm with the cessation of all cooperation if Sweden were to sign the TPNW led to calls for resistance, relayed by Foreign Minister Margot Wallström, who said she wanted to conduct her policy independently.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, op. cit.

<sup>132</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>133</sup> Lyndon Burford, op. cit.

<sup>134</sup> Emanuel Örtengren and Senni Salmi, "Sweden and Finland at Odds over UN Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty", *Center for Transatlantic Relations*, SAIS, September 2017.





## Security-based disarmament models

Different political and identity interests are therefore intertwined to motivate the promotion of disarmament. However, security concerns remain central, whether disarmament is considered in a step-by-step or in a more radical way. Indeed, some actors remain anxious about the risks of a failure of deterrence or the potential effects of unintentional or accidental use. Others are concerned about certain weapon systems, doctrines or arms races the dynamics. But for most actors, a major reason for investment is the conviction that the NPT is crucial to their security. However, they believe that it cannot survive without progress in the field of disarmament.

### ***Concerns about the dangers of nuclear weapons***

#### *The fear of a nuclear conflict*

##### Nuclear weapons as an element of insecurity

During the Cold War, several states gradually became convinced that nuclear weapons could not increase their security but could put them at risk. This was noted by Sweden, which therefore abandoned a national program, but also by Norway or New Zealand. The two countries have therefore chosen to refuse any transfer of nuclear weapons on their territory but also any visit by nuclear allied ships to avoid putting themselves in a vulnerable position and becoming the target of an adverse response. Beyond national security concerns, these choices have also been justified by the two countries as ways of relaxing relations between major powers and thus as to participate in the implementation of restraint and confidence-building measures at their level.<sup>135</sup>

Neighbors of the United States, Canada and Mexico have also experienced the fear of being a collateral victim of a conflict between Washington and Moscow. While their different status (only Canada being a formal American ally) has led to distinct policies, the two countries have nevertheless experienced this geographical proximity as a strong incentive to promote disarmament and limit tensions between the blocs.<sup>136</sup> On the Mexican side, the fears raised by the Cuban crisis are regularly mentioned as motivating factors for the commitment of Alfonso García Robles and the then President Adolfo López Mateos.

In Sweden, this anxiety, as well as the popular opposition, played a role in the decision not to acquire weapons. Stockholm feared that nuclear weapons would threaten its position of non-alignment in times of peace and neutrality in times of war, attract the attention of the Soviet Union and place it as a potential first strike target. This negative view of nuclear weapons as dangerous has infused the Swedish, but also the Austrian, conception and still feeds the visions of

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<sup>135</sup> Rolf Tamnes and Astrid Forland, "Norway", in Harald Müller, op. cit. and Lyndon Burford, op. cit.

<sup>136</sup> Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, op. cit.

disarmament in these two nations.<sup>137</sup> It has convinced diplomats like Alva Myrdal to promote disarmament and to try to rid the European continent of tactical weapons so that it does not turn into a "nuclear battlefield."<sup>138</sup> While Vienna was on Soviet nuclear strike plans and its neighbor Bratislava on NATO's, the Austrians quickly and definitively concluded that nuclear weapons were primarily a security risk. Finally, in Mongolia, similar concerns have led to the adoption of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on its national territory, the establishment of which was intended to signal the high risk of tensions around the country and its desire not to be involuntarily involved in a nuclear conflict.<sup>139</sup>

In this regard, some states regularly emphasize that they consider themselves threatened by the arsenals of nuclear states, a threat that can be mitigated when they formally commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. These arguments are relayed in major disarmament forums by countries, such as Indonesia, which reflect a position generally shared by all NAM members.<sup>140</sup> For Austria today, deterrence is a dangerous game and the "security" provided by deterrence cannot work forever, especially in the current multipolar environment. Described as "Russian roulette", deterrence is therefore perceived in the long term as a global factor of insecurity.<sup>141</sup> In this context, and taking into account the risk posed by nuclear weapons, it may seem "irresponsible" or "desperate" not to commit to disarmament, regardless of the chances of success of the initiatives envisaged.<sup>142</sup>

### Challenging the legitimacy of nuclear weapons

With the rise of the initiative on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, the objectives of the militant community have been reaffirmed. In particular, the conferences held in Oslo, Nayarit, and Vienna aimed to remove any positive notions associated with nuclear weapons and to change the narrative used around their possession. This change of paradigm and culture was based on the willingness of some activists to radically challenge the control of a few countries over the future of civilization. ICAN's campaign was thus built on a questioning of "accepted truths" about the role of deterrence and aimed to redefine concepts and generate new ideas. In its wake, the campaign reversed traditional roles. Some non-nuclear-weapon states have taken a leading role in resisting an unjust order and have taken an emancipatory stance. In contrast, in the rhetoric of the campaign, nuclear states' efforts to appear as responsible powers were countered

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<sup>137</sup> Paul Davis, "Giving Up the Bomb: Motivations And Incentives", *The Nuclear Energy Futures Project*, Centre for International Governance, Innovation, Waterloo and the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, May 2009.

<sup>138</sup> "Swedish Disarmament Policy during the Cold War Conference", *Report*, Stockholm, Editors: Thomas Jonter and Emma Rosengren, Stockholm University, 26 November 2012.

<sup>139</sup> Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhan, "Mongolia", *The Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 12, n° 1, March 2005.

<sup>140</sup> Deepti Choubey, op. cit.

<sup>141</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>142</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

and they were assimilated to possessors of unacceptable, anti-humanist, illegitimate and oppressive weapons of mass destruction.<sup>143</sup>

The two driving forces of the campaign seem to be on the one hand the notion of resistance to an unjust order, a notion whose positive symbolism in popular culture is mobilized to legitimize the movement. On the other hand, it is a question of valuing the ability of non-nuclear-weapon states to act at the expense of nuclear-weapon states to promote their security concepts: recourse to the United Nations General Assembly makes it possible to claim the power of these states, to make their voices heard and to build a counter-hegemony because of their numerical majority.<sup>144</sup>

### *The Fear of accident*

#### Collateral victim, accident, incident and involuntary use

During the major conferences organized by the movement on the humanitarian consequences, the organizers deliberately insisted on the risks of unintentional use and accidents. Thus, incidents in the handling of weapons by the nuclear powers were recalled.<sup>145</sup> In addition, some simulations have shown the consequences of a detonation on the Aviano base in Italy for the rest of the European countries and in particular for Austria, the host country of the conference.<sup>146</sup> These concerns are shared by a number of state and non-state actors. Nuclear weapons pose a security risk to them, whether or not they are used in conflict, and this risk can only be definitively suppressed by the elimination of arsenals. Especially in Europe, but also in Asia where nuclear arsenals are being developed under questionable security conditions, the fear of being the victim of radioactive pollution from an accidental, involuntary or unauthorized explosion is therefore an additional motivation.

#### "Nuclear allergy"

Faced with the consequences of the tests, but also with accidents at power plants such as Chernobyl, Three Mile Island or Fukushima, some countries have developed a real "nuclear allergy" that leads them to fight indiscriminately against civilian and military nuclear power. This reluctance has often led to governmental choices in favor of disarmament in line with the preferences of their citizens. For example, Ireland debated in the late 1970s whether to open a power plant at Carnsore Point, but the project was abandoned in the face of widespread popular opposition. Subsequently, the citizen and political protest focused on the British power plant in Sellafield (Cumbria), which was perceived as a threat to both

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<sup>143</sup> Nick Ritchie and Kjølsv Egeland, op. cit.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> Eric Schlosser, "The Most Dangerous Machines", Presentation made in Vienna, 8-9 December 2014.

<sup>146</sup> Matthew McKinzie, Erwin Polreich, Dèlia Arnold, Christian Maurer and Dr. Gerhard Wotawa, "Calculating the Effects of a Nuclear Explosion at a European Military Base", Presentation made in Vienna, 8-9 December 2014.

islands in the event of an accident.<sup>147</sup> This popular opposition is often not the primary cause of active disarmament diplomacy, but it can sustain an anti-nuclear identity and explain a government's choice of this "niche". For example, in Austria, the population demonstrated early its refusal to use nuclear energy in a referendum on the commissioning of a reactor in Zwentendorf in 1978. The "no" vote then prevailed and led to a law the same year prohibiting the production of nuclear energy.<sup>148</sup> The Chernobyl accident was a major concern for Austrian public opinion and strengthened the country's anti-nuclear identity. Similarly, in Sweden, although the country operates nuclear power plants, the collective awareness of belonging to a society that favors the protection of a healthy environment and general well-being plays a role in the global anti-nuclear identity.<sup>149</sup>

Some leaders, such as Canadian Foreign Minister Howard Charles Green (1959-1963), have become known for their personal mistrust of nuclear power for environmental reasons, a skepticism that has led to pro-disarmament orientations.<sup>150</sup> In Denmark, the anti-nuclear positioning, characteristic within NATO in the 1980s, was almost exclusively based on popular mistrust of nuclear technologies. For example, the country does not exploit nuclear energy to produce electricity on its territory and has refused, until very recently, to exploit uranium present in Greenland, mainly for environmental and health reasons.<sup>151</sup>

### ***Security as a prerequisite for disarmament***

#### *Disarming to impose limits on opponents*

##### Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation

The disarmament logic supported by nuclear powers and their allies promotes their security, in particular insofar as it limits the capabilities of potential adversaries. Thus, the bilateral reduction of arsenals was orchestrated by Washington and Moscow in a mutually binding way and to prevent the opposing party from having a numerical advantage. The benefits of these arms control and reduction measures have also been put in place to preserve resources by curbing the arms race. Similarly, the destruction of entire categories of weapons has been negotiated with a view to removing a mutual threat.

Other disarmament initiatives have in fact also been pursued for proliferation purposes. Thus, while the CTBT and FMCT would be binding on nuclear powers by imposing quantitative and qualitative limitations on their programs, they would

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<sup>147</sup> Richard Sinnott, op. cit.

<sup>148</sup> Peter Weish, "Austria's no to nuclear power", paper presented in Japan (Tokyo, Kyoto and Wakayama) Avril 1988.

<sup>149</sup> Lars van Dassen, "Sweden and the Making of Nuclear Non-Proliferation: From Indecision to Assertiveness", *SKI Report 98:16*, March 1998.

<sup>150</sup> Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, op. cit.

<sup>151</sup> Cindy Verstergaard, "Going non-nuclear in the nuclear alliance: the Danish experience in NATO", *European Security*, vol. 21, n° 1, 2014.

have a greater scope for emerging or nascent nuclear powers for which fissile material development and un-simulated nuclear testing are essential. Disarmament can thus be pursued in the idea that it is more demanding for an adversary and therefore contributes to the security of an actor.

### Disarmament in a regional perspective

At the regional level, similar approaches can be seen in the development of bilateral agreements or nuclear-weapon-free zones. Thus, while they entertained very tense relations, and had initiated military nuclear programs, Brazil and Argentina decided to tie each other's hands. With the signing of a Quadripartite Agreement on 13 December 1991, they definitively abandoned their unconventional ambitions in the belief that their security was strengthened.<sup>152</sup>

Nuclear-weapon-free zones play an important role in reassuring the non-proliferation commitment of regional rivals, and several have been proposed in this framework without success in an attempt to reduce local nuclear risk (Northern Europe, Central Europe, South-East Asia...). The project most discussed today remains the Middle East WMD-free zone project, which aims to meet the security needs of the various non-nuclear states in the zone.

### *Security as an impediment to nuclear disarmament*

#### An argument to block disarmament efforts

Conversely, security concerns may lead states to refuse certain disarmament measures. France, self-proclaimed "realistic champion of disarmament", thus ensures that its policy aims at "*the emergence of a more stable world and the strengthening of its own security*,"<sup>153</sup> which may lead it to oppose proposals concerning its doctrine (adoption of a non-first-use policy...) or its capacities (additional unilateral reductions), with of course a firm opposition to the TPNW shared by all the developed countries. In the United States, major obstacles exist regarding the reduction of the arsenal. Legally, the administration is restricted by Congress in the negotiations it could enter into in this area and must at least preserve parity in each category of regulated weapons. Fundamentally, Washington feels a special responsibility to ensure a liberal and stable world order. In this context, it seems essential and legitimate for the government to have a certain margin of maneuver in defining its required capacities. The United States therefore remains suspicious of multilateral initiatives considered too restrictive.<sup>154</sup>

China, despite its pro-disarmament rhetoric, insists that it must be negotiated in a context of undiminished security for all and equality. It recalls the role of its arsenal in the current environment, which is still crucial to guarantee its sovereignty and to oppose Western interference and American attempts to prevent

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<sup>152</sup> Marco A. Marzo, Alfredo L. Biaggio and Ana C. Raffo, "Nuclear Cooperation in South America: The Common Safeguards System of Brazil and Argentina", *IAEA Bulletin*, 3/1994.

<sup>153</sup> Mr. Hervé de Charette, "La France, champion réaliste du désarmement", *Le Monde*, 13 July 1996.

<sup>154</sup> Marco Fey, Andrea Hellmann, Friederike Flinke, Franziska Plimmer and Carsten Rauch, op. cit.

it from playing its legitimate role on the Asian continent.<sup>155</sup> In addition, it opposes the introduction of certain step-by-step measures, in particular with regard to transparency, the FMCT negotiations or the adoption of the CTBT.

This consideration can lead to a double discourse. Thus, India regularly notices that a nuclear-free world would be safer, which justifies its interest in working in a comprehensive manner on measures to promote disarmament. Nevertheless, it considers that, at present, its security depends on nuclear deterrence. Moreover, in other domains, New Delhi applies a similar reasoning since it has so far refused to participate in humanitarian conventions such as those of Ottawa or Oslo, considering that these measures were contrary to its security.

### A very long-term vision

Nuclear-weapon states are often perceived as opposed to disarmament and very reluctant to sacrifice their deterrent forces. Nevertheless, some have used the power of their diplomatic services to advance the cause of certain disarmament standards in the intimate belief that they contribute to their security. It should be noted that these regulations have been adopted as intermediate measures and as long as they do not compromise their deterrent posture. For Paris, for example, the interest in promoting disarmament norms such as the FMCT or the CTBT is part of a holistic vision of security that integrates the nuclear factor, but also the proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and conventional strategic balances.<sup>156</sup>

In addition, the commitment to general disarmament is recalled with varying degrees of force by the various nuclear states and remains conditional on the emergence of appropriate security conditions. Nevertheless, all recognized nuclear powers have now expressed their desire to see a world without nuclear weapons emerging in the long term.<sup>157</sup>

## ***Pragmatic and tactical visions of disarmament***

### *Revitalizing the NPT regime*

#### Disarmament in a transactional logic

While changes in the United States administration have a significant impact on disarmament policies, Washington, like London, remains sensitive to the use of disarmament as a counterpart to progress in non-proliferation and nuclear security. The Obama administration in particular has recognized the existence of a "bargain" between nuclear and non-nuclear states, and a willingness to operate on a "give and take" basis. Disarmament efforts, illustrated by the introduction of arms control proposals but also initiatives on testing or verification, is viewed

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<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>157</sup> Barry M. Blechman and Alexander K. Bollfrass (eds.), *National Perspectives on Nuclear Disarmament: Unblocking the Road to Zero*, Henry I. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., 2010.

pragmatically. The aim is to safeguard American interests by convincing the entire international community to take action to preserve them, by combating proliferation programs or by attempting to control the circulation of fissile materials.<sup>158</sup> Thus, at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the Obama administration committed its political capital to reaching a consensus on the final document. In its compromise with the NAM, it highlighted its disarmament efforts and participated in the adoption of an ambitious Action Plan in this area. This positioning, illustrated as early as 2009 in President Obama's Prague speech, concluded the Review Conference in an atmosphere that was positive for what has generally been described as a great success for the future of the NPT.<sup>159</sup> On Washington's side, the political objectives were deemed to have been met with general support for the IAEA safeguards system and a reaffirmation of the need to comply with the Treaty.<sup>160</sup>

This logic is not new: in 1995, the United States had already put forward disarmament measures (adoption of the CTBT, negotiation of an FMCT, progress in bilateral matters, etc.) to obtain the unlimited extension of the NPT.<sup>161</sup>

Many states attach great importance to the sustainability of the NPT and its respect as a guarantor of international security. But they believe that this can only be considered in the long term if all signatories comply with their obligations. They are therefore genuinely concerned about the lack of progress in the disarmament pillar. This is expressed by supporting progressive steps such as the FMCT (Canada), the CTBT (European Union, Kazakhstan, Japan), or the reduction of alert levels (Switzerland and Sweden in particular). It can also take the form of a disruptive posture in the context of the movement on humanitarian consequences and TPNW (Austria, New Zealand).<sup>162</sup> It should be noted that in some countries there is no consensus on how best to proceed in order to achieve this objective and strengthen the NPT. The governments in power in Switzerland and Sweden in 2010 considered that the TPNW perspective could generate a positive dynamic in this way. Their successors have chosen to be more reserved about this initiative. For example, Sweden has so far refused to join the regime and many political leaders have distanced themselves from the initiative.<sup>163</sup> In August 2018, the Swiss Federal Council indicated that it did not wish to sign or

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<sup>158</sup> David Santoro, "The Optimistic Nuclear Weapon States: The United States and the United Kingdom", in Tanya Ogilvie-White and David Santoro, op. cit.

<sup>159</sup> Jayantha Dhanapala, "Evaluating the 2010 NPT Review Conference", *USIP Special Report 258*, USIP, October 2010.

<sup>160</sup> Deepti Choubey, "Understanding the 2010 NPT Review Conference", Q&A, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 3 June 2010, and Deepti Choubey and Susan Burk, "The 2010 NPT Review Conference: What Happened and What Next?", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 17 June 2010.

<sup>161</sup> Randy Rydell, "Looking Back: The 1995 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference", *Arms Control Today*, 1 April 2005.

<sup>162</sup> Interview conducted in Geneva, September 2018.

<sup>163</sup> Stefan Lindgren, "När Sverige vände vände på en femöring", *Nyhetsbanken*, 5 November 2018.

ratify the Treaty "under the current conditions."<sup>164</sup> However, it has committed to reassessing the issue by 2020.<sup>165</sup>

### Setting an example

Like the transactional logic, the idea of disarming to set an example is not consensual among nuclear states. Thus, France regularly denies the knock-on effect of unilateral disarmament or the existence of a positive or negative impact of its nuclear policy on proliferation.<sup>166</sup> Others express different opinions, by conviction or opportunity.

Thus, India and China regularly promote their doctrine of no-first-use as an element that should be generalized, contributes to stability and is an indispensable first step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.<sup>167</sup>

For the United Kingdom, there is a strong link between disarmament and non-proliferation and only sincere efforts to implement Article VI can deter new states from proliferating in the long term.<sup>168</sup> This conviction was also reflected in the policies of the Clinton and Obama administrations.

### *Disarming in an domestic context*

#### Managing political opposition

While the electoral argument has been highlighted for some non-nuclear-weapon states (see above), it can also play a role among the nuclear-weapon states, particularly democratic ones, which sometimes have to adjust their programs for political reasons. Thus, in the United Kingdom, the renewal of the Trident system was supported by a majority in Parliament and in the public, but raised many objections with an anti-nuclear coalition composed of citizens (activation of former militant networks including the CND), religious associations (mobilization of the Anglican Church against the Trident) and independentists (linkage between the struggle for independence and against deterrence by the Scottish National Party). In this context, the government has been vigilant in highlighting the United Kingdom's commitment to disarmament and illustrating the country's responsible implementation of the NPT.<sup>169</sup> This effort to shape a positive image remains

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<sup>164</sup> Press release, "At present, the Federal Council has no plans to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons", Federal Council, Bern, 15 August 2018.

<sup>165</sup> "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons", Motion 18.4097, EC Foreign Policy Committee, 26 October 2018.

<sup>166</sup> Bruno Tertrais, *La France et la dissuasion nucléaire : concept, moyens, avenir*, La Documentation Française, Paris, 2017.

<sup>167</sup> Rajesh Basrur, op. cit.

<sup>168</sup> David Santoro, op. cit.

<sup>169</sup> "Replacing the UK's 'Trident' Nuclear Deterrent", *Research Briefing*, House of Commons, 11 July 2016.



essential in London with a desire to appear credible both in terms of deterrence and disarmament.<sup>170</sup>

The interest of such a policy can be observed *a contrario*. Thus, the lack of demonstrated efforts to implement the NPT in all its aspects may have been one of the factors behind the US Congress' rejection of the capabilities requested by the Bush Administration. Particular attention had been paid to the introduction of new weapons considered as "tactical."<sup>171</sup> Such difficulties could again be considered under the Trump administration with the coming in power of Democrats in the House.

Finally, within alliances, such as NATO, disarmament efforts can also be necessary to make the nuclear policy acceptable for all partners and avoid internal divisions.

### Disarming for budgetary reasons

Historically, budgetary considerations have played a significant role in the adoption of disarmament measures, including the reduction of arsenals, whether unilateral or bilateral. This was the case, for example, with the adoption of the SALT and ABM Treaty in 1972,<sup>172</sup> or President George H. Bush's decision to reduce US arsenals through the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992.<sup>173</sup> This remains true to some extent: when asked whether it would be appropriate to pursue arms control measures with Russia, President Trump recalled that nuclear weapons "are expensive."<sup>174</sup> In addition, he also indicated that his cancellation of the joint exercises with North Korea "allowed great savings."<sup>175</sup> On the Russian side, relieving the budgetary pressure from armament programs has long been and remains to this day a major motivation for negotiating bilateral arms control measures with Washington. On the British and French sides, unilateral disarmament measures have also been motivated by economic concerns when the strategic interest of the systems was no longer obvious.

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<sup>170</sup> Nick Ritchie and Benoît Pelopidas, "European nuclear nationalism", in Nik Hynek and Michal Smetana (eds), op. cit.

<sup>171</sup> Daryl G. Kimball, "Congress Cuts Nuclear Bunker-Buster", *Proliferation Analysis*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 26 October 2005.

<sup>172</sup> Brian E. Kempfer, "History of Negotiations and Politics of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)," Honors Projects, n°40, Bowling Green State University, 28 April 2013.

<sup>173</sup> Susan J. Koch, *The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992*, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, Washington DC, September 2012.

<sup>174</sup> Jeff Mason and William James, "Trump to talk to Russia's Putin about substantially reducing nuclear weapons", *Reuters*, 13 July 2018.

<sup>175</sup> Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, "Trump's Promises to Kim Jong-un Leave U.S. and Allies Scrambling", *The New York Times*, 15 June 2018.



## CONCLUSION

The cause of nuclear disarmament has been pursued for many reasons and in many different forms. The short and long-term objectives of this commitment vary, as does the forms it takes. Over the course of history, some factors may have lost relevance (pacifism, environmentalism), while others have gained visibility (humanitarian law).

The creation of categories and typologies in this study face several obstacles. Thus, the same policy can be pursued for different motivations within an organization itself. In a state, different government agencies often have different concerns that may or may not be reconciled in the policy choices made. Thus, in Europe, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Defense are often pointed out for their differences on priorities: the country's image, the role of mediator, coalition work can be favored by the former while the latter will be more sensitive to security considerations. Moreover, in some states where the individual weight of civil servants is significant due to the reduced volume of services, motivations can change rapidly according to the personal convictions of the officials in charge of cases.

At the highest level, changes in the international context or in domestic political balances can have a significant impact on a state's priorities. This has recently been observed with Norway, which abandoned its profile as a disarmament leader with the change of majority in 2013, but also in Switzerland, where the transition from Micheline Calmy-Ray to Didier Burkhalter as head of the Executive Council has had the effect of reducing interest in the humanitarian dimension of nuclear weapons.

Finally, for the same actor, a policy is often motivated by several factors at once. We can therefore identify at best a cloud of motivations where some seem to be priorities and others secondary in justifying the engagement.

Generally speaking, however, we note the importance of security, which still motivates a large number of actors, particularly in the North, despite the changing strategic environment. This takes various and sometimes contradictory forms depending on the actors, but with a widespread desire to preserve the NPT by resolving what is perceived as a major imbalance. Ethical and humanitarian postures remain supported by the most "radical" in the field of disarmament: they inextricably combine altruistic convictions and questions of image, the desire to increase one's international and domestic political capital by working for the security of all. Finally, some actors use the argument of disarmament to challenge a world order that is unfavorable to them, but here again, this political posture is often linked to other concerns, which may be security, ethics (principle of justice in particular) or identity.

This panorama highlights historical aspects. It is often impossible to fully understand the current positioning of an actor without perceiving the legacy of the past. This often conditions the policies of stakeholders, as do some major national

leaders and officials whose influence extends beyond their actions or the construction of true anti-nuclear identities anchored within populations and their governments.

For a number of actors, engagement in multilateral fora for nuclear disarmament is not very demanding and does not require major costs. But for others, the efforts are followed by real, financial, personal or political investments. Some positions may even have negative consequences for a state and damage its bilateral relations with, for example, nuclear-weapon states. This study makes it possible to understand the various security, political or image benefits that justify these costs and have convinced states and non-state actors to promote this issue sometimes for decades. By noting the different facets of their motivations, it aims to limit the simplifications and caricatures that can be made. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to perceive the complexities of a policy and its evolutions over time.<sup>176</sup> In this way, it can contribute to a better understanding of each other's intentions and foster a more peaceful dialogue between the various actors of the world nuclear order.

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<sup>176</sup> Karston Frey, "Nuclear Weapons as Symbols, The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making", *IBEI Working Papers*, n° 3, 2006.

## Annexe 1

### SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATION OF THE TPNW MARCH 2019

States	Signature	Ratification
South Africa	September 20, 2017	
Algeria	September 20, 2017	
Antigua and Barbuda	September 26, 2018	
Austria	September 20, 2017	May 8, 2018
Bangladesh	September 20, 2017	
Benin	September 26, 2018	
Brazil	September 20, 2017	
Brunei Darussalam	September 26, 2018	
Bolivia	April 17, 2018	
Cambodia	January 9, 2019	
Cape Verde	September 20, 2017	
Chile	September 20, 2017	
Colombia	August 3, 2018	
Comoros	September 20, 2017	
Congo	September 20, 2017	
Costa Rica	September 20, 2017	July 5, 2018
Ivory Coast	September 20, 2017	
Cuba	September 20, 2017	January 30, 2018
El Salvador	September 20, 2017	
Ecuador	September 20, 2017	
Fiji	September 20, 2017	
Gambia	September 20, 2017	September 26, 2018
Ghana	September 20, 2017	
Guatemala	September 20, 2017	
Guinea Bissau	September 26, 2018	
Guyana	September 20, 2017	September 20, 2017
Honduras	September 20, 2017	
Cook Islands		September 4, 2018
Indonesia	September 20, 2017	
Ireland	September 20, 2017	
Jamaica	December 8, 2017	
Kazakhstan	March 2, 2018	
Kiribati	September 20, 2017	
Laos	September 21, 2017	
Libya	September 20, 2017	

States	Signature	Ratification
Liechtenstein	September 20, 2017	
Madagascar	September 20, 2017	
Malaysia	September 20, 2017	
Malawi	September 20, 2017	
Myanmar	September 26, 2018	
Mexico	September 20, 2017	January 16, 2018
Namibia	December 8, 2017	
Nepal	September 20, 2017	
Nicaragua	September 22, 2017	July 19, 2018
Nigeria	September 20, 2017	
New Zealand	September 20, 2017	July 31, 2018
Palau	September 20, 2017	May 3, 2018
Palestine	September 20, 2017	March 22, 2018
Panama	September 20, 2017	
Paraguay	September 20, 2017	
Peru	September 20, 2017	
Philippines	September 20, 2017	
Central African Republic	September 20, 2017	
Democratic Republic of Congo	September 20, 2017	
Dominican Republic	June 7, 2018	
Saint Lucia	September 29, 2019	
Holy See	September 20, 2017	September 20, 2017
San Marino	September 20, 2017	September 26, 2018
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	December 8, 2017	
Samoa	September 20, 2017	September 26, 2018
Sao Tome and Principe	September 20, 2017	
Seychelles	September 26, 2018	
Thailand	September 20, 2017	September 20, 2017
Togo	September 20, 2017	
East Timor	September 26, 2018	
Tuvalu	September 20, 2017	
Uruguay	September 20, 2017	July 25, 2018
Vanuatu	September 20, 2017	September 26, 2018
Venezuela	September 20, 2017	March 27, 2018
Vietnam	September 22, 2017	May 17, 2018
Total Total	69	19

## Annexe 2

### STATES THAT VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE TIAN PROJECT AT THE UNITED NATIONS, 7 JULY 2017

